Exploring the boundaries and ontology of Psychiatric Disorders (PDs) using the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) model
A previous version of this paper has been mistakenly published on April 19, 2021. Please refer to the current revised version.
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.20416/LSRSPS.V8I2.3Mots-clés :
Essentialisme, Ontology, Désordres psychiatriques, Homeostatic Property ClusterRésumé
In this article we show that, even though the classification and diagnosis of Psychiatric Disorders (PDs) are performed according to essentialist terms, the psychiatric diagnoses currently employed, (i.e., clinical psychiatry) do not actually meet these criteria. Diagnosis is performed operationally. In this paper, we suggest a change of perspective. We reject essentialism relating to PDs and argue for the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) model, which allows a greater insight into the ontology of PDs than the operational perspective. More specifically, we argue that the HPC model allows for a synthesis of continuous and discrete methods of understanding the boundaries between PDs. Finally, we specify in a more general manner, the kind of ontology we deal with when adopting the HPC model, arguing that this model can be viewed as a mirror device, reflecting the ontological features of PDs.
Références
ADRIAENS, Pieter R., DE BLOCK Andreas. 2013. Why We Essentialize Mental Disorders. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 38, 107-127. Lien
APA, (1980). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed.), American Psychiatric Press: Washington, DC.
APA, (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (4th ed.), American Psychiatric Press: Washington, DC.
ARAGONA, Massimiliano. 2015. Rethinking Received Views on the History of Psychiatric Nosology: Minor Shifts, Major Continuities. In ZACHAR, Peter (ed.), STOYANOV Drozdstoy (ed.), ARAGONA Massimiliano (ed.), JABLENSKY Assen (ed.). Alternative Perspectives on Psychiatric Validation DSM, ICD, RDoC, and Beyond. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 27-46. Lien
BJELLAND, Ingvar, LIE Stein A., DAHL Alv A., MYKLETUN Arnstein, STORDAL Eystein, KRAEMER Helena C. 2009. A Dimensional Versus a Categorical Approach to Diagnosis: Anxiety and Depression in the HUNT 2 Study. International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 18(2), 128–137, Lien
BORSBOOM, Denny. 2008. Psychometric Perspectives on Diagnostic Systems. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 64, 1089–1108 Lien
Id. 2017. A network theory of mental disorders. World psychiatry, 16(1), 5-13. Lien
BORSBOOM, Denny, CRAMER Angelique O. 2013. Network Analysis: An Integrative Approach to the Structure of Psychopathogenesy. The Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 9, 91-121 Lien
BORSBOOM, Denny, CRAMER Angelique O., KALIS Annemarie. 2019. Brain Disorders? Not Really: Why Network Structures Block Reductionism in Psychopatology Research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42, e2, 1-63. Lien
BOYD, Richard. 1988. How to be a moral realist. Contemporary Materialism, 307 - 356. Lien
Id. 1991. Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies, 61, 127–148. Lien
Id. 1999. Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa. In WILSON, Robert A. (ed.). Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, Cambridge, MIT Press. Lien
BOLTON, Derek. 2008. What Is Mental Disorder? An Essay in Philosophy, Science, and Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lien
Id. 2012. Classification and Causal Mechanisms: a Deflationary Approach to the Classification Problem. In KENDLER, Kenneth (ed.), PARNAS Josef (ed.). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6-11. Lien
BROMAN-FULKS, Joshua, DEACON Brett, OLATUNJIC Bunmi, BONDY Carmen, ABRAMOWITZ Jonathan, TOLIN David. 2010. Categorical or Dimensional: A Reanalysis of the Anxiety Sensitivity Construct. Behavior Therapy, 41, 154–171. Lien
CAHALAN, Susannah. 2019. The Great Pretender: The Undercover Mission That Changed Our Understanding of Madness. Grand Central Pub. Lien
CRAVER, Carl F. 2007. Explaining the Brain. Clarendon Press: Oxford. Lien
Id. 2009. Mechanisms and Natural Kinds. Philosophical Psychology, 22, 575–594. Lien
COOPER, Rachel. 2005. Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Dordrecht, Springer. Lien
Id. 2007. Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science. Stocksfield, UK, Acumen.
Id. 2012. Is Psychiatric Classification a Good Thing? In KENDLER, Kenneth (ed.), PARNAS Josef (ed.). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 61-69. Lien
DEACON, Brett. 2013. The Biomedical Model of Mental Disorder: A Critical Analysis of its Validity, Utility, and Effects on Psychotherapy Research. Clinical Psychology Review. Lien
DECKER, Hannah S. 2007. How Kraepelinian was Kraepelin? How Kraepelinian are the neo-Kraepelinians? – from Emil Kraepelin to DSM-III. History of Psychiatry. 18(3), 337-360. Lien
DEWEY, John. 1925. Experience and Nature, Dover, New York, NY.
ERESHEFSKY, Marc. Fall 2017 Edition. Species, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ZALTA, Edward N. (ed.), Lien
ERESHEFSKY, Marc, REYDON Tomas. 2015. Scientific kinds: a Critique of HPC Theory and a Proposal for an Alternative Account. Philosophical Studies, 172, 969–986. Lien
FINE, Arthur. 1984. The Natural Ontological Attitude. In Scientific Realism. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 83–107. Lien
FIRST, Michael B. (2012). The National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project: moving Towards a Neuroscience-Based Diagnostic Classification in Psychiatry. In KENDLER, Kenneth (ed.), PARNAS Josef (ed.). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 12–18. Lien
FRANCES, Allen, MACK Avram, FIRST Michael, WIDIGER Thomas, ROSS Ruth, FORMAN Leslie, DAVIS Wendy W. 1993. DSM – IV Meets Philosophy. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 19, 207-218. Lien
FRIED, Eiko I. 2015. Problematic Assumptions Have Slowed Down Depression Research: why Symptoms, not Syndromes are the Way Forward. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1-11, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00309. Lien
GLASOFER, Deborah R., BROWN Amanda J., RIEGEL Melissa. 2015. Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID). Encyclopedia of Feeding and Eating Disorders. Lien
GHAEMI, Nassir S. 2012. Taking Disease Seriously: Beyond “Pragmatic” Nosology. In KENDLER, Kenneth (ed.), PARNAS Josef (ed.). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 41–53. Lien
GROB, Gerald N. 1991. Origins of DSM-I: a study in appearance and reality. American Journal of Psychiatry, 148, 421–31. Lien
HACKING, Ian. 1998. Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses. University of Virginia Press. Lien
Id. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press. Lien
HASLAM, Nick. 2000. Psychiatric Categories as Natural Kinds: Essentialist Thinking About Mental Disorder. Social Research, 67, 1031–1058. Lien
Id. 2002a. Kinds of Kinds: A Conceptual Taxonomy of Psychiatric Categories. Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology, volume (3), 203 – 217. Lien
Id. 2002b. Practical, Functional, and Natural Kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology, volume (9), No. 3, 238 – 241. Lien
Id. 2003. Categorical versus dimensional models of mental disorder: The taxometric evidence. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 37(6), 696-704. Lien
HAUSWALD, Rico, KEUCK Lara. 2017. Indeterminacy in Medical Classification: On Continuity, uncertainty, and Vagueness. In KEIL, Geert (ed.), KEUCK Lara (ed.), HAUSWALD Rico (ed.). Vagueness in Psychiatry, 93-116. Lien
JABLENSKY, Assen. 2012. The Nosological Entity in Psychiatry: a Historical Illusion or a Moving Target? In KENDLER, Kenneth (ed.), PARNAS Josef (ed.). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 77-94. Lien
Id. 2016. Psychiatric Classifications: Validity and Utility. World Psychiatry, 15, 26-31. Lien
JAMES, William. 1907. Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Lien
KAISER, Marie. 2011. The Limits of Reductionism in the Life Sciences. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. Volume (33), No. 4, Causation and Disease, 453-476. Lien
Id. 2015. Reductive Explanation in the Biological Sciences. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, Springer. Lien
KASNIN, Jacob S. 1994. The acute schizoaffective psychoses. Am J Psychiatry, 151(6 Suppl), 144–54, Lien
KENDELL, Robert, JABLENSKY Assen. 2003. Distinguishing between the Validity and Utility of Psychiatric Diagnoses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 4–12. Lien
KENDLER, Kenneth, ZACHAR Peter, CRAVER Carl. 2011. What Kinds of Things Are Psychiatric Disorders? Psychological Medicine, 41, 1143–1150. Lien
KENDLER, Kenneth, PARNAS Josef. 2012. Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lien
KENDLER, Kenneth, FIRST Michael. 2010. Alternative futures for the DSM revision process: iteration v. paradigm shift. British Journal of Psychiatry, 197 (4), 263 – 5. Lien
KENDLER, Kenneth. 2005. Toward a Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 433-440. Lien
Id. 2012. Levels of explanation in psychiatric and substance use disorders: implications for the development of an etiologically based nosology. Molecular Psychiatry, 17, 11–21. Lien
KESHAVAN, Matcheri, MORRIS David, SWEENEY John, PEARLSON Godfrey, THAKER Gunvant, SEIDMAIN Larry, EACK Shaun, TAMMINGA Carol. 2011. A dimensional approach to the psychosis spectrum between bipolar disorder and schizophrenia: The Schizo-Bipolar Scale, Schizophrenia Research, 133(1-3), 250–254. Lien
KHALIDI, Muhammad Ali. 1993. Carving Nature at The Joints. Philosophy of Science, volume (60), No. 1, 100- 113. Lien
KRAEPELIN, Emil. 1913. Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry. JOHNSTONE, Thomas (ed.), 3rd English ed. (New York: William Wood & Co.; reprinted, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002); originally published in 1905 as Einführung in die Psychiatrische Klinik. Zweiunddreißig Vorlesungen, 2nd ed.
MUTHéN, Bengt. 2006. Should Substance use Disorders be Considered as Categorical or Dimensional? American Psychiatric Association, Journal compilation, Society for the Study of Addiction, 101, (Suppl. 1), 6–16. Lien
MURPHY, Dominic. 2006. Psychiatric in the Scientific Image, Cambridge: MIT Press. Lien
Id. 2015. Validity, Realism and Normativity. In ZACHAR, Peter (ed.), STOYANOV Drozdstoj (ed.), ARAGONA Massimiliano (ed.), JABLENSKY Assen (ed.), Alternative Perspectives on Psychiatric Validation DSM, ICD, RDoC, and Beyond, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 60-75. Lien
RODRIGUES, Adriano, BANZATO Claudio. 2015. Reality and Utility Unbound: An Argument for Dual-Track Nosologic Validation. In ZACHAR, Peter (ed.), STOYANOV Drozdstoj (ed.), ARAGONA Massimiliano (ed.), JABLENSKY Assen (ed.), Alternative Perspectives on Psychiatric Validation DSM, ICD, RDoC, and Beyond, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 47-59. Lien
ROSENBERG, Alex. 2006. Darwinian reductionism. Or, how to stop worrying and love molecular biology. Cambridge, University of Chicago Press. Lien
ROSENHAN, David. 1973. On Being Sane in Insane Places. Science, 179, 379–399. Lien
RUSCIO, John, HASLAM Nick, RUSCIO Ayelet. 2006. Introduction to the Taxometric method: a Practical Guide. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Lien
SABBARTON-LEARY, Nigel, BORTOLOTTI Lisa, BROOME Matthew. 2015. Natural and Pare-Natural Kinds in Psychiatry. In ZACHAR, Peter (ed.), STOYANOV Drozdstoj (ed.), ARAGONA Massimiliano (ed.), JABLENSKY Assen (ed.), Alternative Perspectives on Psychiatric Validation DSM, ICD, RDoC, and Beyond, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 76-93. Lien
SCHAFFNER, Kenneth. 2012. A Philosophical overview of the Problems of Validity for Psychiatric Disorders. In KENDLER, Kenneth (ed.), PARNAS Josef (ed.). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 170-189. Lien
SHEAR, Katherine, BJELLAND Ingvar, BEESDO Katja, GLOSTER Andrew, EITTCHEN Hans-Ulrich. 2007. Supplementary Dimensional Assessment in Anxiety Disorders. International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 16(S1), S52–S64, Lien
SORENSEN, Roy. 2011. Para-natural Kinds. In CAMPBELL, Joe (ed.), O’ROURKE Michael (ed.), SLATER Matthew (ed.). Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lien
SZASZ, Thomas. 1960. The Myth of Mental Illness. American Psychologist, 15, 113-118. Lien
TABB, Kathryn. 2015. Psychiatric Progress and the Assumption of Diagnostic Discrimination. Philosophy of Science, 82, 1047-1058. Lien
Id. 2019. Philosophy of Psychiatry After Diagnostic Kinds. Synthese, 196.6, 2177-2195. Lien
TSOU, Jonathan. 2011. The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Case of the DSM and Psychiatric Classification. Journal of the Philosophy of History, 5, 445–469. Lien
Id. 2006. Natural Kinds, Psychiatric Classification and the History of the DSM. History of Psychiatry. volume27(4), 406-424. Lien
VAN LOO, Hanna, ROMEIJN Jan-Willem, DE JONGE Peter, SCHOEVERS Robert. 2012. Psychiatric Comorbidity and Causal Disease Models. Preventive Medicine, 57, 748-752. Lien
WADE, Derick, HALLIGAN Peter. 2004. Do Biomedical Models of Illness make for good Healthcare Systems? Education and debate, 329, 1398-1401. Lien
WALTERS, Glenn, McGRATH Robert, KNIGHT Raymond. 2010. Taxometrics Polytomous Constructs, and the Comparison Curve Fit Index: A Monte Carlo analysis. Psychological Assessment, 22, 149–156. Lien
WHITAKER, Robert. 2001. Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the Enduring Mistreatment of the Mentally Ill, New York: Basic Books. Lien
Id. 2010. Anatomy of an epidemic: Magic bullets, psychiatric drugs, and the astonishing rise of mental illness in America, New York: Crown. Lien
WIDIGER, Thomas, SAMUEL Douglas. 2005. Diagnostic Categories or Dimensions? A Question for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—Fifth Edition. Journal of Abnormal Psychology Copyright, the American Psychological Association, volume (114), No. 4, 494–504. Lien
WILSON, Robert, BARKER Matthew, BRIGANDT Ingo. 2007. When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds, Philosophical Topics, 35, 189–215, Lien
ZACHAR, Peter. 2000. Psychiatric Disorders Are Not Natural Kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology, 7, 167–182. Lien
Id. 2002. The Practical Kinds Model as a Pragmatist Theory of Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Volume (9), No. 3, 219-227. Lien
Id. 2012. Progress and the calibration of scientific constructs: the role of comparative validity. In KENDLER, Kenneth (ed.), PARNAS Josef (ed.). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 21-34. Lien
Id. 2014. Metaphysics of Psychopathology. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. Lien
ZACHAR, Peter, KENDLER Kenneth. 2007. Psychiatric Disorders: A Conceptual Taxonomy. Am J Psychiatry, 164, 557–565. Lien
ZACHAR, Peter, STOYANOV Drozdstoj, ARAGONA Massimiliano, JABLENSKY Assen. (2015). Alternative Perspectives on Psychiatric Validation DSM, ICD, RDoC, and Beyond, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lien
Téléchargements
Publiée
Comment citer
Numéro
Rubrique
Licence
(c) Tous droits réservés Marco Casali 2021
Ce travail est disponible sous licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.
Les auteurs conservent le droit d'auteur et accordent à la revue le droit de première publication, l'ouvrage étant alors disponible simultanément, sous la licence Licence d’attribution Creative Commons permettant à d'autres de partager l'ouvrage tout en en reconnaissant la paternité et la publication initiale dans cette revue.
