Indeterminate and vague causation

Abstract

Is it sometimes indeterminate whether two events or variables are causally related? Can causal statements be vague? The analysis of three potential types of cases of causal indeterminacy and causal vagueness yields an affirmative answer. The claim that some cases of omission, and some cases of prevention, give rise to indeterminate causal relations depends on the premise that omissions and preventions can be causal. A second type of indeterminate causation corresponds to causal statements whose truth value is indeterminate because they contain vague predicates. Such vagueness can have two sources. Only one yields indeterminate causation. Finally, there is indeterministic probabilistic causation. If “indeterministic overdetermination” is interpreted as metaphysical rather than epistemic, it is inappropriate to speak of indeterminacy. Rather, there is no fact of the matter about which of the two sources of probability raising really is the cause. It is more appropriate to say that both are contributing causes. “Indeterministic trumping” gives rise to a form of indeterminacy that belongs to the category of the open future. Once the effect has occurred, no indeterminacy remains.