L’imprévisibilité de la science : un argument pour la liberté de recherche ? La découverte des ARNi comme étude de cas

Abstract

The unpredictability of the development of science is often invoked to defend the epistemic value of a free, curiosity-driven, disinterested research, against its finalization by practical objectives. My work aims at initiating a rigorous critical analysis of this “unpredictability argument”. To do so, I consider a case study: the discovery of the RNA interference. I show that the use of this episode to defend a principle of scientific autonomy is misleading. In this case indeed, the unpredictable part of the discovery emerged from use inspired science, whereas basic research only generated predictable results. I suggest that the unpredictability argument, often used in a superficial way, misses its target by mixing the question of the genesis and that of the management of the unexpected. The distinction of these two aspects of the problem is necessary, I contend, to evaluate the value and the limits of the unpredictability argument.