Remarks on Hansson’s model of value-dependent scientific corpus
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20416/LSRSPS.V10I1.4Keywords:
values in science, corpus model, Sven Ove Hansson, context of application, corpus entry requirementAbstract
This article discusses Hansson's corpus model for the influence of values (in particular, non-epistemic ones) in the hypothesis acceptance/rejection phase of scientific inquiry. This corpus model is based on Hansson's very convincing concepts of scientific corpus and science ‘in the large sense’. I present Hansson's corpus model of value influence, comment on its origins, analyse its advantages and disadvantages, and conclude that it is a very good candidate for managing value influence, because contrary to other models in the literature it is simple, it provides a universal procedure for dealing with values, and it systematically preserves the epistemic integrity of science. I comment on potential difficulties associated with this model: how it manages controversial non-epistemic values; the difficulties associated with systematically taking the maximum corpus entry requirement (difficulty to identify this maximum requirement, and non-optimality with respect to other less demanding requirements); and the issue whether a claim belonging to the corpus could still be deemed not reliable enough for practical applications. I note that these issues do not put into question the applicability of the corpus model, but rather underline the need of precisely defining the frontier between the corpus and its context of application. Finally, I call for empirical work (in particular, interviews of practising scientists) in order to better assess these issues.References
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Carrier, M. (2022). What does good science-based advice to politics look like? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 53(1), 5–21.
ChoGlueck, C. (2018). The error is in the gap: Synthesizing accounts for societal values in science. Philosophy of Science 85(4), 704–725.
Churchman, C. W. (1948). Statistics, pragmatics, induction. Philosophy of Science 15 (3), 249–268.
Douglas, H. (2009). Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. University of Pittsburgh Pre.
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Elliott, K. C. and D. Steel (2017). Current controversies in values and science. Taylor & Francis. Gundersen, T. (2018). Scientists as experts: A distinct role? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69, 52–59.
Gundersen, T. (2020). Value-free yet policy-relevant? the normative views of climate scientists and their bearing on philosophy. Perspectives on Science 28(1), 89–118.
Hansson, S. O. (2007a). Values in pure and applied science. Foundations of Science 12 (3), 257–268.
Hansson, S. O. (2007b). What is technological science? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38(3), 523–527.
Hansson, S. O. (2010). Changing the scientific corpus. In O. Erik and E. Sebastian (Eds.), Belief revision meets philosophy of science, pp. 43–58. Springer.
Hansson, S. O. (2013). What is technological knowledge? In I.-B. Skogh and M. J. D. Vries (Eds.), Technology teachers as researchers. Philosophical and Empirical Technology Education Studies in the Swedish TUFF Research School, pp. 15–31. Brill Sense.
Hansson, S. O. (2014). How context dependent is scientific knowledge? In Epistemology, Context, and Formalism, pp. 127–140. Springer.
Hansson, S. O. (2017). How values can influence science without threatening its integrity. In Logic, methodology and philosophy of science Proceedings of the 15th International Congress, pp. 207–221.
Hansson, S. O. (2018). Politique du risque et intégrité de la science. pp. 57–86. Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté.
Hansson, S. O. (2020a). Social constructionism and climate science denial. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10(3), 1–27.
Hansson, S. O. (2020b). Values in pharmacology. In Uncertainty in Pharmacology, pp. 375–396. Springer.
Hicks, D. J. (2014). A new direction for science and values. Synthese 191 (14), 3271–3295. Holman, B. and T. Wilholt (2022). The new demarcation problem. Studies in history and philosophy of science 91, 211–220.
Idel’čik, I. E. (1966). Handbook of hydraulic resistance: coefficients of local resistance and of friction. Israel Program for Scientific Translations.
Intemann, K. (2015). Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2), 217–232.
Jeffrey, R. C. (1956). Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 23(3), 237–246.
John, S. (2012). Mind the gap. review of heather douglas: Science, policy and the value-free ideal. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1), 218 – 220.
Kitcher, P. (2011). Philosophy inside out. Metaphilosophy 42 (3), 248–260.
Kourany, J. A. (2010). Philosophy of Science after Feminism. Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977). Objectivity, value judgement, and theory choices. In The Essential Tension— Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Lacey, H. (2017). Distinguishing between cognitive and social values. See Elliott and Steel (2017), pp. 15–30.
Levi, I. (1960). Must the scientist make value judgments? The Journal of Philosophy 57(11), 345–357.
Longino, H. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge. Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McMullin, E. (1982). Values in science. In PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association, Volume 1982, pp. 3–28. Philosophy of Science Association.
Möller, N. and S. O. Hansson (2008). Principles of engineering safety: Risk and uncertainty reduction. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 93 (6), 798–805.
Morgan, G. J. (2010). Heather douglas: Is science value-free?(science, policy, and the value-free ideal). Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (2), 423–426.
Niiniluoto, I. (1993). The aim and structure of applied research. Erkenntnis 38 (1), 1–21. Parascandola, M. (2010). Epistemic risk: empirical science and the fear of being wrong. Law, Probability & Risk 9(3-4), 201–214.
Polanyi, M. (1962/2000). The republic of science: Its political and economic theory. Minerva 1 (38), 1–21.
Reiss, J. and J. Sprenger (2020). Scientific Objectivity. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Rudner, R. (1953). The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of science 20 (1), 1–6.
Ruphy, S. (2006). “empiricism all the way down”: a defense of the value-neutrality of science in response to helen longino’s contextual empiricism. Perspectives on Science 14(2), 189–214.
Steel, D., C. Gonnerman, and M. O’Rourke (2017). Scientists’ attitudes on science and values: Case studies and survey methods in philosophy of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63, 22–30.
UN (1992, 3-14 June). Annex 1. rio declaration on environment and development.
Wagenknecht, S., N. J. Nersessian, and H. Andersen (2015). Empirical philosophy of science: Introducing qualitative methods into philosophy of science. In Empirical Philosophy of Science, pp. 1–10. Springer.
Carrier, M. (2022). What does good science-based advice to politics look like? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 53(1), 5–21.
ChoGlueck, C. (2018). The error is in the gap: Synthesizing accounts for societal values in science. Philosophy of Science 85(4), 704–725.
Churchman, C. W. (1948). Statistics, pragmatics, induction. Philosophy of Science 15 (3), 249–268.
Douglas, H. (2009). Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. University of Pittsburgh Pre.
Elliott, K. C. (2011). Is a little pollution good for you?: Incorporating societal values in environ- mental research. OUP USA.
Elliott, K. C. (2013). Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3), 375–383.
Elliott, K. C. (2017). A tapestry of values: An introduction to values in science. Oxford University Press.
Elliott, K. C. and D. Steel (2017). Current controversies in values and science. Taylor & Francis. Gundersen, T. (2018). Scientists as experts: A distinct role? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69, 52–59.
Gundersen, T. (2020). Value-free yet policy-relevant? the normative views of climate scientists and their bearing on philosophy. Perspectives on Science 28(1), 89–118.
Hansson, S. O. (2007a). Values in pure and applied science. Foundations of Science 12 (3), 257–268.
Hansson, S. O. (2007b). What is technological science? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38(3), 523–527.
Hansson, S. O. (2010). Changing the scientific corpus. In O. Erik and E. Sebastian (Eds.), Belief revision meets philosophy of science, pp. 43–58. Springer.
Hansson, S. O. (2013). What is technological knowledge? In I.-B. Skogh and M. J. D. Vries (Eds.), Technology teachers as researchers. Philosophical and Empirical Technology Education Studies in the Swedish TUFF Research School, pp. 15–31. Brill Sense.
Hansson, S. O. (2014). How context dependent is scientific knowledge? In Epistemology, Context, and Formalism, pp. 127–140. Springer.
Hansson, S. O. (2017). How values can influence science without threatening its integrity. In Logic, methodology and philosophy of science Proceedings of the 15th International Congress, pp. 207–221.
Hansson, S. O. (2018). Politique du risque et intégrité de la science. pp. 57–86. Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté.
Hansson, S. O. (2020a). Social constructionism and climate science denial. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10(3), 1–27.
Hansson, S. O. (2020b). Values in pharmacology. In Uncertainty in Pharmacology, pp. 375–396. Springer.
Hicks, D. J. (2014). A new direction for science and values. Synthese 191 (14), 3271–3295. Holman, B. and T. Wilholt (2022). The new demarcation problem. Studies in history and philosophy of science 91, 211–220.
Idel’čik, I. E. (1966). Handbook of hydraulic resistance: coefficients of local resistance and of friction. Israel Program for Scientific Translations.
Intemann, K. (2015). Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2), 217–232.
Jeffrey, R. C. (1956). Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 23(3), 237–246.
John, S. (2012). Mind the gap. review of heather douglas: Science, policy and the value-free ideal. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1), 218 – 220.
Kitcher, P. (2011). Philosophy inside out. Metaphilosophy 42 (3), 248–260.
Kourany, J. A. (2010). Philosophy of Science after Feminism. Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977). Objectivity, value judgement, and theory choices. In The Essential Tension— Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Lacey, H. (2017). Distinguishing between cognitive and social values. See Elliott and Steel (2017), pp. 15–30.
Levi, I. (1960). Must the scientist make value judgments? The Journal of Philosophy 57(11), 345–357.
Longino, H. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge. Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McMullin, E. (1982). Values in science. In PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association, Volume 1982, pp. 3–28. Philosophy of Science Association.
Möller, N. and S. O. Hansson (2008). Principles of engineering safety: Risk and uncertainty reduction. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 93 (6), 798–805.
Morgan, G. J. (2010). Heather douglas: Is science value-free?(science, policy, and the value-free ideal). Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (2), 423–426.
Niiniluoto, I. (1993). The aim and structure of applied research. Erkenntnis 38 (1), 1–21. Parascandola, M. (2010). Epistemic risk: empirical science and the fear of being wrong. Law, Probability & Risk 9(3-4), 201–214.
Polanyi, M. (1962/2000). The republic of science: Its political and economic theory. Minerva 1 (38), 1–21.
Reiss, J. and J. Sprenger (2020). Scientific Objectivity. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Rudner, R. (1953). The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of science 20 (1), 1–6.
Ruphy, S. (2006). “empiricism all the way down”: a defense of the value-neutrality of science in response to helen longino’s contextual empiricism. Perspectives on Science 14(2), 189–214.
Steel, D., C. Gonnerman, and M. O’Rourke (2017). Scientists’ attitudes on science and values: Case studies and survey methods in philosophy of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63, 22–30.
UN (1992, 3-14 June). Annex 1. rio declaration on environment and development.
Wagenknecht, S., N. J. Nersessian, and H. Andersen (2015). Empirical philosophy of science: Introducing qualitative methods into philosophy of science. In Empirical Philosophy of Science, pp. 1–10. Springer.
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2023-12-15
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Stamenkovic, Philippe. 2023. “Remarks on Hansson’s Model of Value-Dependent Scientific Corpus”. Lato Sensu: Revue De La Société De Philosophie Des Sciences 10 (1):39-62. https://doi.org/10.20416/LSRSPS.V10I1.4.
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