Les valeurs dans la representation scientifique
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20416/LSRSPS.V10I1.3Keywords:
Valeurs, Représentation scientifiqueAbstract
The aim of this article is to examine the role played by values in representational activities in science, in particular in model construction and use. The analysis is based on a distinction between concrete and abstract representation. A hierachical model is proposed. The conclusion is that the influence of social values in scientific representation depends on the level of abstraction considered. It is only problematic if local values are used to evaluate more general representations.
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