L' Attention et la justification des croyances perceptives
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.20416/LSRSPS.V7I3.1Mots-clés :
Attention, Perception, Justification doxastique, Justification propositionnelle, conscience phénoménale, conscience, conscience d’accèsRésumé
L’objectif de cet essai est de défendre la thèse selon laquelle l’attention endogène est une condition nécessaire de la justification des croyances perceptives. Je critique l’approche phénoménale selon laquelle c’est le caractère phénoménal (ou la phénoménologie) des expériences perceptives qui confère à celles-ci leur rôle dans la justification. Je prendrai pour cible principale la version qu’en offrent Siegel et Silins (2014 ; 2019). Contre cette approche, je défends que la notion de justification ne peut se comprendre sans référence aux mécanismes cognitifs par lesquels le sujet peut mobiliser une raison à l’appui de ses attitudes propositionnelles – mécanismes que les approches phénoménales négligent et pour lesquels l’attention est nécessaire. En m’appuyant sur la distinction entre justification propositionnelle et justification doxastique, je critique d’abord les cas supposés de justification en l’absence d’attention avant d’élaborer un argument en deux temps. Dans un premier temps, je montre que l’attention endogène, en raison de son rôle fonctionnel, est nécessaire pour la justification doxastique. Dans un second temps, en m’appuyant sur les analyses de Turri (2010), j’établis que la justification propositionnelle a également pour condition nécessaire l’attention.
Références
ALSTON, William P. 1985. Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist, 68 (1), 57-89. 10.5840/monist198568116
ARIELY, Dan. 2001. Seeing Sets : Representation by Statistical Properties. Psychological Science, 12 (2), 157-162. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00327
AWH, Edward., JONIDES, John, REUTER-LORENZ, Patricia. 1998. Rehearsal in Spatial Working Memory., Journal of Experimental Psychology and Human Perceptual Performance, 24 (3), 780-790. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.24.3.780
AWH, Edward, JONIDES, John. 2001. Overlapping Mechanisms of Attention and Spatial Working Memory., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5 (3), 119-126. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01593-X
AWH, Edward, VOGEL, Edward, OH, Seihwan. 2006. Interactions between Attention and Working Memory., Neurosciences, 139(1), 201-208. doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2005.08.023
AWH, Edward, BELOPOLSKY, Artem, THEEUWES, Jan. 2012. Top-down versus Bottom-up Attentional Control : A Failed Theoretical Dichotomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(8), 437-443. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.010
BADDELEY, Alan. 1983. Working Memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B Series, Biological Sciences, 302 (1110), 311-324. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1983.0057
BERGHOFER, Philipp. 2020. Motivating and Defending the Phenomenological Conception of Perceptual Justification. Inquiry. doi : 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1712232.
BLOCK, Ned. 1995. On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(02), 227-247. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00038188
BLOCK, Ned. 2007. Consciousness, Accessibility and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30 (5/6), 481-499. DOI: 10.1037/0096-1523.24.3.780
BONA, Silvia, SILVANTO, Juha. 2014. Accuracy and Confidence of Visual Short-Term Memory Do not Go Hand-in-hand : Behavioral and Neural Dissociations. PLoS ONE, 9, e90808. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0090808
BRONFMAN, Zohar, BREZIS, Noam, JACOBSON, Hilla, USHER, Marius. 2014. We See More than We Can Report : « Cost Free » Color Phenomenality Outside Focal Attention. Psychological Science, 25 (7), 1394-1403. doi: 10.1177/0956797614532656
CARRASCO, Marisa, LING, Sam, READ, Sarah. 2004. Attention Alters Appearances. Nature Neuroscience, 7 (3), 308-313. doi: 10.1038/nn1194
CHOW, Michael, CONWAY, Andrew. 2015. The Scope and Control of Attention: Sources of Variance in Working Memory Capacity. Memory & Cognition, 43(3), 325–-339. doi: 10.3758/s13421-014-0496-9
COHEN, Michael, DENNETT, Daniel, KANWISHER, Nancy. 2016. What Is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience ? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(5), 324-335. doi : 10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.006
COWAN, Nelson. 2005. Working Memory Capacity. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. doi: 10.4324/9780203342398
de GARDELLE, Vincent, SACKUR, Jérôme, KOUIDER, Sid. 2009. Perceptual Illusions in Brief Visual Presentations. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 569-577. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.03.002
DEHAENE, Stanislas, CHARLES, Lucie, KING, Jean-Rémi, MARTI, Sébastien. 2014. Toward a Computational Theory of Conscious Processing. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 25C, 76-84. doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2013.12.005
DEHAENE, Stanislas, NACCACHE, Lionel. 2001. Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness : Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework. Cognition, 79 (1-2), 1-37. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2
DESCARTES, René. 1644. Les principes de la philosophie. Paris, Vrin, 2009.
DOKIC, Jérôme. 2004. Qu’est-ce que la perception ? Paris, Vrin, Chemins philosophiques.
DRETSKE, Fred I. 1969. Seeing and Knowing, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
DRETSKE, Fred I. 2007. What Change Blindness Teaches Us about Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), 216-230. doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00126.x
EILAN, Naomi. 1998. Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness. In O’HEAR, Anthony (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind., Cambridge University Press, 181-202.
ENNS, James, Di LOLLO, Vincent. 2000. What’s New in Visual Masking ? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4 (9), 345-352. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01520-5
ERIKSSON, Johan, VOGEL, Edward, LANSNER, Anders, BERGSTROM, Fredrik, NYBERG, Lars. 2015. Neurocognitive Architecture of Working Memory. Neuron, 88 (1), 33–46. 10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.020
FIRTH, Roderick. 1978. Are Epistemological Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts ? In GOLDMAN, Alvin, KIM, Jaegwon (dir.). Values and Morals. Reidel Publishing Company, 215-229.
FRÄSSLE, Stefan, SOMMER, Jens, JANSEN, Andreas, NABER, Marnix, EINHÄUSER, Wolfgang. 2014. Binocular Rivalry : Frontal Activity Relates to Introspection and Action, but not to Perception. The Journal of Neuroscience, 34 (5), 1738-1747. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4403-13.2014
FREEMAN, Jeremy, SIMONCELLI, Eero. 2011. Metamers of the Ventral Stream. Nature Neuroscience, 14 (9), 1195-1201. doi: 10.1038/nn.2889
GAZZALEY, Adam, NOBRE, Anna. 2012. Top-down Modulation: Bridging Selective Attention and Working Memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16 (2), 129-135. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.014
GEORGE, F.H. (1957) Epistemology and the Problem of Perception., Mind, 66 (264), pp.491-506. doi: 10.2307/2251056
GIBSON, Eleanor, RADER, Nancy. 1979. Attention ; The Perceiver as Performer. In HALE, Gordon, LEWIS, Michael (dir.). Attention and Cognitive Development, Springer, 1-21. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4613-2985-5_1
HUEMER, Michael. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman & Littlefield.
JACKSON-NIELSEN, Molly, COHEN, Michael, PITTS, Michael. 2017. Perception of Ensemble Statistics Requires Attention. Consciousness and Cognition, 48, 149-160. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.11.007
JAMES, William. 1890. Principles of Psychology. New York, Holt & Co.
JENNINGS, Carolyn Dicey. 2015. Consciousness Without Attention. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1 (2), 276-295. doi: 10.1017/apa.2014.14
KENTRIDGE, Robert, HEYWOOD, Charles, WEISKRANTZ, Lawrence. 1999. Attention Without Aawareness in Blindsight. Proceedings of the Royal Society, London, B, 266(1430), pp.1805-1811. doi: 10.1098/rspb.1999.0850
KENTRIDGE, Robert, HEYWOOD, Charles, WEISKRANTZ, Lawrence. 2004. Spatial Attention Speeds Discrimination without Awareness in Blindsight. Neuropsychologia, 42(6), 831-835. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.11.001
KENTRIDGE, Robert W. 2013. Visual Attention : Bringing the Unseen Past into View. Current Biology, 23(2), R69-71. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2012.11.056
KIM, Jaegwon. 1988. What is « Naturalized Epistemology » ? Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 381-405. doi: 10.2307/2214082
KING, Jean-Rémi., PESCETELLI, Niccolo, DEHAENE, Stanislas. 2016. Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Brief Maintenance of Seen and Unseen Sensory Information. Neuron, 92, 1122-1134. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2016.10.051
KITCHER, Philip. 1992. The Naturalists Return. The Philosophical Review, 101 (1), 53-114. doi: 10.2307/2185044
KOCH, Cristoph, TSUCHIYA, Naotsogu. 2007. Attention and Consciousness : Two Distinct Brain Processes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(1), 16-22. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.0
KUNDU, Bornali, SUTTERER, David., EMRICH, Stephen, POSTIE Bradely. 2013. Strengthened Effective Connectivity Underlies Transfer of Working Memory Training to Tests of Short-Term Memory and Attention. Journal of Neuroscience, 33 (20), 8705-8715. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5565-12.2013
LECAS, Claude. 1992. L’attention visuelle : de la conscience aux neurosciences. Liège, Mardaga.
LEPSIEN, Joran, THORNTON, Ian, NOBRE, Anna. 2011. Modulation of Working-Memory Maintenance by Directed Attention. Neuropsychologia, 49 (6), 1569–1577. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.03.011
LEVI, Dennis. 2011. Visual Crowding. Current Biology, 21 (18), R678. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.07.025
MACK, Arien, ROCK, Irvin. 1998. Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.
MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice. 1946. La phénoménologie de la perception. Paris, Gallimard.
MEWHORT, Douglas., CAMBPBELL, A.J., MARCHETTI, M., CAMPBELL, Jamie. 1981. Identification, Localization and, « Iconic Memory » : An Evaluation of the Bar-Probe Task. Memory and Cognition, 9(1), 50-67. doi: 10.3758/BF03196951
MITROFF, Stephen, SCHOLL, Brian. 2005. Forming and Updating Object Representations without Awareness : Evidence from Motion-Induced Blindness. Vision Research, 45(8), 961-967. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2004.09.044
NACCACHE, Lionel. 2018. Why and How Access Consciousness Can Account for Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 373(1755) : 20170357. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0357
NAVON, David. 1977. Forest Before Trees : The Precedence of Global Features in Visual Perception. Cognitive Psychology, 9(3), 353-383. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(77)90012-3
OVERGAARD, Morten. 2011. Visual Experience and Blindsight : A Methodological Review. Experimental Brain Research, 209(4), 473-479. doi: 10.1007/s00221-011-2578-2
PRINZMETAL, William, AMIRI, Hedy, ALLEN, Kristin, EDWARDS, Tami. 1998. Phenomenology of Attention: I. Color, Location, Orientation, and Spatial Frequency. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 24 (1), 261-282. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.24.1.261
RENSINK, Ronald R., O’REGAN, Kevin, CLARK, James. 1997. To See or not to See : The Need for Attention to Perceive Changes in Scenes. Psychological Science, 8 (5), 368-373. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00427.x
ROESSLER, Johannes. 1999. Perception, Introspection, and Attention. European Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1), 47-64. doi: 10.1111/1468-0378.00073
ROESSLER, Johannes. 2009. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge. Mind, 118 (472), 1013-1041. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzp131
ROESSLER, Johannes. 2011. Perceptual Attention and the Space of Reasons. In MOLE, Christopher, SMITHIES, Declan, WU, Wayne (dir.). Attention, Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 274-291.
SAYIM, Bilge, WAGEMANS, Johan. 2017. Appearance Change and Error Characteristics in Crowding Revealed by Drawings., Journal of Vision, 17 (11), 1-16. doi: 10.1167/17.11.8
SELLARS, Wilfrid. 1956. Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind. In FEIGL Herbert, SCRIVEN, Michael (dir.). Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, 253-329.
SERGENT, Claire, WYART, Valentin, BABO-REBELO, Mariana, COHEN, Laurent, NACCACHE, Lionel, TALLON-BAUDRY, Catherine. 2013. Cueing Attention after the Stimulus Is Gone Can Retrospectively Trigger Conscious Perception. Current Biology, 23(2), 150-155. 10.1016/j.cub.2012.11.047
SHALEV, Lilac, TSAL, Yehoshua. 2002. Detecting Gaps with and without Attention : Further Evidence for Attentional Receptive Fields. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 14(1), 3-26. doi: 10.1080/09541440143000005
SIEGEL, Susanna. 2006. How Does Visual Phenomenology Constrain Object-Seeing ? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84 (3), 429-441. doi: 10.1080/00048400600895961
SIEGEL, Susanna, SILINS, Nicholas. 2014. Consciousness, Attention, and Justification. In DODD, Dylan, ZARDINI, Elia (dir.). Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. 149-169. doi: 10.1080/00048400600895961
SIEGEL, Susanna, SILINS, Nicholas. 2019. Attention and Perceptual Justification. In PAUTZ, Adam, STOLJAR, Daniel (dir.). Blockheads ! MIT Press. 487-504.
SIMONS, Daniel. CHABRIS, Christopher. 1999. Gorillas in Our Midst : Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events. Perception, 28, 1059-1074. doi: 10.1068/p281059
SIMONS, Daniel, CHABRIS, Christopher, SCHNUR, Tatiana, LEVIN, Daniel. 2002. Evidence for Preserved Representations in Change Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition, 11(1), 78-97. doi: 10.1006/ccog.2001.0533
SMITHIES, Declan. 2011. Attention Is Rational Access Consciousness. In MOLE, Christopher, SMITHIES, Declan, WU, Wayne (dir.). Attention, Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 247-273.
THALABARD, Emile. 2018. Voir et remarquer : Dretske sur la cécité au changement. Philosophie, 137, : 67-89. doi : 10.3917/philo.137.0067.
THIBAULT, Louis, van den BERG, Ronald, CAVANAGH, Patrick, SERGENT, Claire. 2016. Retrospective Attention Gates Discrete Conscious Access to Past Sensory Stimuli. PLoS ONE, 11(2). doi: : 10.1371/journal.pone.e0148504.
TITCHENER, Edward. 1910. Attention as Sensory Clearness. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 7 (7), 180-182. doi: 10.2307/2010783
TREISMAN Anne, GELADE, Garry. 1980. A Feature-Integration Theory of Attention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97-136. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(80)90005-5
TSAL, Yehoshua, SHALEV, Lilac. 1996. Inattention Magnifies Perceived Length : The Attentional Receptive Field Hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 22(1), 233–243. doi: 10.1037//0096-1523.22.1.233
TURRI, John. 2010. On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80 (2), 312-326. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00331.x
TYE, Michael. 2009. Consciousness Revisited. MIT Press.
USHER, Marius, BRONFMAN, Zohar, TALMOR, Shiri, JACOBSON, Hilla, EITAM, Baruch. 2018. Consciousness without Report : ; Insights from Summary Statistics and Inattention « Blindness ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences, 373(1755), 20170354. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0354
VISION, Gerald. 1998. Blindsight and Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology, 11 (2), 137-159. doi : 10.1080/09515089808573253
WARD, Emily, BEAR, Adam, SCHOLL, Brian. 2016. Can you perceive ensembles without perceiveing individuals ? The Role of Statistical Perception in Determining whether Awareness Overflows Access. Cognition, 152, 786-86. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.010
WATZL, Sebastian. 2011. The Nature of Attention. Philosophy Compass, 6(/11), 842-853. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00433.x
WEISKRANTZ, Lawrence. 1986. Blindsight : A Case Study and its Implications. Oxford University Press.
WEISKRANTZ, Lawrence. 2009. Is Blindsight just Degraded Normal Vision ? Experimental Brain Research, 192, 413-416. doi: 10.1007/s00221-008-1388-7
WOLFE, Jeremy. 2000. Visual Attention. In De VALOIS, Karen (dir.). Seeing, 2e édition. San Diego, Academic Press. 335-386.
WRIGHT, Wayne. 2005. Distracted Drivers and Unattended Experience. Synthese, 144(1), 41-68. doi: 0.1007/s11229-005-9128-z
WU, Wayne. 2014. Attention. Routledge.
WYART Valentin, TALLON-BAUDRY, Catherine. 2008. Neural Dissociations between Visual Awareness and Spatial Attention. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(10), 2667-2679. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4748-07.2008
ZEKI, Semir. 2007. A Theory of Micro-Consciousness. In VELMANS, Max, SCHNEIDER, Susan (dir.). The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell Publishing. 580-588. doi: 10.1002/9780470751466.ch46
Téléchargements
Publiée
Comment citer
Numéro
Rubrique
Licence
(c) Tous droits réservés Émile Thalabard 2020
Ce travail est disponible sous licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.
Les auteurs conservent le droit d'auteur et accordent à la revue le droit de première publication, l'ouvrage étant alors disponible simultanément, sous la licence Licence d’attribution Creative Commons permettant à d'autres de partager l'ouvrage tout en en reconnaissant la paternité et la publication initiale dans cette revue.