Unjustified Criticism of Metaphysics

  • Cláudia Ribeiro Centre for the Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon
Mots-clés: experience, assumptions, intuition, criticism, metaphysics


At the same time as a purported renewal of metaphysics is taking place in analytical philosophy, criticism of metaphysics has also increased. Criticism of metaphysics is usually made by naturalistic metaphysicians and is aimed at non-naturalistic metaphysics. Without endorsing any of the above schools, in this essay I undertake, not a criticism of metaphysics, but a criticism of the current criticism of metaphysics. I therefore review some of the most important issues at stake in this criticism, which merely recycles centuries-old criticism of metaphysics in general: the alleged sterility and futility of metaphysics, its vagueness, the propensity for fantasy, the lack of imagination and foresight, its alleged dependence on intuition and, above all, its independence from experience. I conclude that all these criticisms supply an inaccurate image of metaphysics and a concomitant inaccurate image of science rooted in a refusal to recognize that a strict separation between a priori and a posteriori cannot be achieved.

Biographie de l'auteur

Cláudia Ribeiro, Centre for the Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon

PhD member of the Centre for the Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon



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Comment citer
Ribeiro, Cláudia. 2015. « Unjustified Criticism of Metaphysics ». Lato Sensu: Revue De La Société De Philosophie Des Sciences 2 (1). https://doi.org/10.20416/lsrsps.v2i1.123.
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