Contradiction in Bhedābheda Vedānta

A Paraconsistent and Glut-Theoretic Approach to Jīva’s Acintya Bhedābheda Theology

Abstract

Abstract: Bhedābheda refers to a family of Vedānta traditions that assert that ultimate reality, Brahman, is both different (bheda) and non-different (abheda) from the world and individual selves. At first glance, this seems like a contradictory statement. However, most Bhedābheda thinkers, such as Bhāskara (8th-9th Century), Nimbārka (13th Century?) and Vijñānabhikṣu (16th Century), attempt to reconcile the contradiction, asserting, for example, that Brahman is different from the world and individual selves in one sense, yet non-different in another, distinct sense of “difference.” A notable exception seems to be Jīva Gosvāmī (16^th Century), a leading theologian of the Caitanya (15^th-16^th Century) Vaiṣṇava school. According to a widely accepted interpretation, Jīva accepts the contradiction, adding that it is inconceivable (acintya). Despite textual evidence supporting this view, evidence from Jīva’s writings and subsequent commentaries suggests his theology might also be reconstructed using the more traditional contradiction-avoiding approach. The purpose of this paper is to offer an integrated interpretation of Jīva’s Acintya Bhedābheda Vedānta, one that synthesizes both interpretations while staying true to the key elements of his ontology. This will be based on a version of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP), which I refer to as a Logic of Partial Truth (LPT). The result is a paraconsistent and glut-theoretic approach to Jīva’s theology.