Geach Is Right, but God Is Good

Defusing Eric Wiland’s Threat to Divine Goodness

Abstract

Peter Geach argues that “good” and “bad” are always logically attributive adjectives. Geach’s position is highly plausible and enjoys the support of many philosophers. But in a recent paper, Eric Wiland argues that if Geach is correct, then the claim “God is good” is nonsense. Wiland’s argument undermines any philosophical, theological, or religious tradition which regards the claim “God is good” as true or even meaningful. If the theist finds Geach’s account of goodness persuasive but wishes to affirm that God is good meaningfully, the theist must defuse Wiland’s argument. In this paper, I refute Wiland’s argument by exposing an unjustified assumption Wiland makes regarding the nature of attributive adjectives. Crucially, however, rejecting Wiland’s assumption does not require rejecting Geach’s account of “good.” Rather, I argue, the thesis that God is good remains meaningful, even if Geach is right that “good” and “bad” are always logically attributive adjectives.