Neoclassical Theism and the Problem of Foreknowledge and Passibility

Abstract

Though it is often not recognized, there are multiple models of God being affirmed and debated throughout the history of philosophical theology. In contemporary discussion, we have developed labels for these models such as classical theism, neoclassical theism, open theism, panentheism, and pantheism. In this paper I want to discuss a unique problem that neoclassical theism faces. This is the Problem of Foreknowledge and Passibility. God is passible in that God is capable of being moved and influenced by creatures to some extent. God is capable of having a wide range of emotional responses to the world that are consistent with His perfect goodness and rationality. Also, God is capable of having maximal empathy with His creatures. Yet, there are some philosophers and theologians who think that divine passibility is inconsistent with exhaustive foreknowledge. As a neoclassical theist, I disagree. Before considering the inconsistency argument, I need to set the stage. In section 1, I shall articulate the neoclassical theistic model of God. In section 2, I will discuss some different issues related to omniscience, time, and emotions. These issues need to be developed in order to understand the objection to neoclassical theism. Then in section 3, I will develop two arguments against the compatibility of passibility and foreknowledge. There I will explain why the neoclassical theist has nothing to worry about from these objections.