Unity in Divine Complexity

A Paracomplete Constructivist Model

Abstract

: I argue that a focus on articulating God’s unity in terms of divine simplicity has overshadowed the exploration of alternative theories of divine complexity. Assessing the compatibility between models of the divine nature and formulations of unity, I claim that, whereas the principle of unity implicitly upheld within common models of divine simplicity begs the question against complexity, the rival notion of inseparable unity is insufficient. I therefore propose a stricter non-question-begging principle of unity that is only applicable to divine complexity within a paracomplete constructivist logical framework; that is, one rejecting the inviolability of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) and allowing for a logical underdetermination, or gap, in the case of God. In the remaining part of the article, I develop my model in greater detail, discussing its logical underpinnings; application to the categories of entity and property within a constituent ontology; and use of constructive set theory to account for multiple intensional properties. Finally, I show how my model allows for the logically consistent articulation of strict unity for a complex divine nature.