Inordinatio Boni

A Rearticulation of Privation Theory

Abstract

If God is the origin of all being, but is not the origin of evil, it must follow that evil is not a being. That is, evil has no positive existence. As such, evil is always a parasitic absence of the good; its sting lies in the deprivation of some good that ought to be (Anglin & Goetz, 1982). But this account faces serious challenges. Can the description of evil as a lack of good—even of a good that ought to be—adequately account for the human experience of evil? Heidegger seems to critique privatio boni precisely on the grounds that the alleged “lack” of evil can color one’s whole existence—e.g., like a bout with cancer or disease (Capobianco, 1991). How can privatio boni be defended in a world haunted by the Holocaust? In my estimation, privation theory will benefit from a rearticulation. In this article, I will attempt to reformulate privatio boni as inordinatio boni. I will argue that evil is best understood as a disordering of the good—an inorganic whole, as it were—and that this account enables the affirmation that God is not the cause of evil—for evil is always a parasitic fracturing of the order of the good. The paper will proceed as follows. First, I will briefly articulate the notion of privatio boni. Next, I will argue that the phenomena of natural evil and pain do not fit within a privation concept of evil. Third, I will define and defend the notion of inordinatio boni within the resources of Christian theology, showing how it can metaphysically account for evils such as cancer alongside moral evils such as maliciousness. Finally, I will respond to several potential objections.