Richard Cartwright on Logic and the Trinity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v6i2.63893Keywords:
Peter Geach, Richard Cartwright, Trinity, Relativity of identity, Formal contradictionAbstract
It is often maintained that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity implies a contradiction. It is sometimes maintained that if the doctrine is formulated in a way consonant with the thesis that “identity is always relative to a sortal term,” it can be shown that it does not involve a contradiction. Richard Cartwright has contended that an appeal to “the relativity of identity” cannot change the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent with a principle that is “evident to the natural light of reason,” namely If every A is a B, then there cannot be fewer B’s than A’s. The purpose of this essay is to examine and evaluate that contention.
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