Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust

  • Jonathan C. Rutledge University of St Andrews
Keywords: Analytic Theology, Epistemic Self-trust, the Fall, Effects of Sin, Original Sin

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.

Published
2018-03-27
How to Cite
Rutledge, J. (2018). Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust. TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2(1), 84-94. https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303