The Love Argument for the Trinity:  
A Reformulation

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Abstract: The central focus of this article is to provide a new “Love Argument” for the necessary truth of the Latin “model” of the doctrine of the Trinity—termed “Latin Trinitarianism”—from an a priori standpoint. This new argument, called the Agápêic Argument, will be formulated in light of the metaphysical notions of a “trope,” introduced by D. C. Williams, and “multiple location,” posited by Antony Eagle, and the ethical concept of agápê, proposed by Alexander Pruss. Doing this will provide a specific argument that provides strong grounds for affirming the necessary truth of the Trinity, without, however, being subject to the primary objections that have been often raised against the existing versions of the argument.

Keywords: Trinity; Agápê; A Priori; Necessity; Tropes; Location

1. Introduction

According to the doctrine of the Trinity, there exists one “God” and three distinct persons: the Father, the Son and the Spirit. These persons are “relationally” distinct—in the sense that they are solely individuated by their relations to one another: the Father is “unbegotten,” the Son is “begotten,” and the Spirit is “spirated” by the Father and/through the Son. Each of the persons of the Trinity is (in some sense) God,” and thus they are “homoousious” with one another. Yet, despite each of the persons being God, there is solely one “God” within the Trinitarian life. We can state the central tenets of this doctrine more succinctly as such:

(1) (The Trinity)  
(i) There exists three persons: the Father, the Son and the Spirit, each of whom is “God” and thus homoousious (i.e., of the same essence)  
(ii) There is one “God.”
In the field of “analytic theology”—which is a research programme focused on using the tools and techniques of contemporary analytic philosophy to help clarify and justify central Christian claims—certain “models” (or “theories”/“conceptions”) of the doctrine of the Trinity have been proposed to aid one in establishing the coherence of this specific teaching.\(^1\) In the contemporary literature, two main types of models have been proposed: Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism. Social Trinitarianism, which has been defended by individuals such as Cornelius Plantinga (1988) and Richard Swinburne (1994, 2018), is a model that conceives of the Trinity as including within it three distinct entities: the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are each “persons” (in the modern sense of the word) who share the same divine nature (i.e., exemplify or instantiate a type identical but token distinct property of divinity), and who are necessarily united in mutual love and purpose so as to form a “community” identified as the one God. Second, Latin Trinitarianism, which has been defended by individuals such as Brian Leftow (2004) and Nikk Effingham (2015),\(^2\) is a model that conceives of the Trinity as including within it the existence of one entity that subsists in three “persons”: the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Each person of the Trinity is numerically identical to this one “subsisting” entity (i.e., an entity that exists in and of itself), yet each is also distinct from one another—with this distinction being construed in a “qualitative” or “relational” sense.\(^3\)

For the adherents of Social and Latin Trinitarianism, the main focus has been on demonstrating how these specific models correspond to the central tenets of (1) and provide a means of demonstrating the logical coherence of this doctrine. Despite the importance of this task, one can ask, however, the question of what good reason is there for believing in the truth of these specific models? The primary philosophical argument that has been put forward in literature is that of the “Love Argument,” which aims to show the cogency of the doctrine of the Trinity. More precisely, the Love Argument, expressed most recently in the work of Swinburne (1994, 2018),\(^4\) seeks to establish the necessary truth of a Social

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\(^1\) I will interchange between these terms throughout this article without any change in meaning.

\(^2\) An additional model of the Trinity that has risen in prominence is that of Monarchical Trinitarianism, which was introduced by Beau Branson (2022). However, as this specific model, at its most basic level, is not a substantial metaphysical thesis (rather, it is simply a linguistic identification of the Father as the one “God”), this model will not be further detailed in this article. Nevertheless, for a metaphysical development of Monarchical Trinitarianism (within a Social Trinitarian and Latin Trinitarian framework), see (Sijuwade, 2021a, 2022).

\(^3\) The former qualitative distinction will be affirmed in this article. More on this below.

\(^4\) In putting forward this argument, Swinburne follows in the footsteps of the 12th-century medieval theologian Richard of St. Victor. For St. Victor’s argument and overall view on the Trinity, see (On The Trinity). Furthermore, for other versions of the Love Argument in the
conception of the Trinity from an *a priori* standpoint. That is, the necessary truth of this model can be known *prior to (revelatory) experience*, based on the fact that if there exists a solitary divine person, God (i.e., the Father), defined as an essentially everlastingly omnipotent person, then one can know *a priori* that it is necessarily true that this divine person will everlastingly generate two other interdependent divine persons in order for him (and them) to exemplify perfect love. This theoretical postulation, which we can term the “Love Argument,” can be stated more succinctly through the following syllogism:

(2) (Love Argument) 
(i) Necessarily, if God exemplifies perfect love, then he causes to exist two other interdependent divine persons.
(ii) God exemplifies perfect love.
(iii) Therefore, necessarily God causes to exist two other interdependent divine persons.

Within this specific argument, the term “*a priori*” picks out statements that are independent of experience; yet, hold based on certain conditions that are dependent on experience, which support the position that is being argued for. That is, these statements are *a priori* in a certain sense by taking the following form: if $x$ (e.g. God) exists and $y$ (e.g. God exemplifies perfect love) holds—where the condition of $x$ existing and $y$ holding are derivable from our experience—then $z$ (e.g. the action of God causing other divine persons) will necessarily happen—which is then the *a priori* entailment from conditions $x$ and $y$ being the case. Hence, the argument being formulated here is more accurately taken to be “partially” *a posteriori*—concerning the existence and holding of certain conditions—and “partially” *a priori*—concerning the entailments that are derivable from the existence and holding of the certain conditions. Nevertheless, given this schema, one can see that at the heart of the Love Argument—and thus its central premise: premise (i)—is the purported fact that the conception of “perfect love” and is thus definable as a *mutual* and *unselfish* love that, according to Swinburne (1996, 191), is “a supreme good”. By perfect love being a “supreme good,” it would present God with a *unique best action* that, as a *perfectly good* being, he must perform. In other words, the exemplification of perfect love by the solitary divine person, $d_1$, 

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5 Swinburne does not himself term this argument “the Love Argument”—which originates with the author—neither does he state, in any of his writings on the subject, the Love Argument in a deductive format. However, for other deductive formulations of this argument that are different from the one in the main text, see (Tuggy, 2021) and (Vohánka, 2013).
would be an overall best action (or more specifically, a unique best action), and thus there would be an “overriding reason”—a reason that supports an action as being sensible, appropriate, reasonable and rational to be performed—for \(d_1\) to inevitably and everlastingly generate another divine person: \(d_2\), so as to share their love (i.e., all that is good for them) with one another, thus there being a mutuality to love. Furthermore, it would also be an overall best action for \(d_1\) and \(d_2\) to cooperate with one another to inevitably and everlastingly bring about another divine person: \(d_3\)—so as for them together to share their love with one another and provide another person for their beloved to love and be loved by—thus there being an unselfishness to love. Hence, given the nature of love that is in play here, if there is one divine person, then, necessarily, there will be two other divine persons—knowledge concerning the truth of this is obtainable a priori. That is, the truth of a particular conception of the Trinity—that of Social Trinitarianism—is thus an a priori necessary truth. As, the conclusion reached by this argument establishes the necessary existence of three subsisting entities: the persons of the Trinity, that are each interdependent—rather than one subsisting entity, that each of the persons of the Trinity are numerically identical to. Hence, as it stands, this argument provides grounds, if successful, for affirming a Social Trinitarian model of the Trinity. However, one can now ask the important question: is there a way to further reformulate this argument as one that can establish the cogency of Latin Trinitarianism? Let’s term this the Reformulation Task. The central focus of this article will be on completing the Reformulation Task; however, in order for this task to be successful, a further, more general, issue would need to be dealt with, which is that of addressing an objection that has been raised against the Love Argument itself—let’s term this the Dispositional Objection.

The Dispositional Objection, expressed most recently in the work of Dale Tuggy (2015, 2021), raises an issue against the truth of premise (i) of the Love Argument based on the fact that, according to Tuggy (2021, 264), “perfect lovingness” is a character trait (or “disposition”)—and thus like other character traits (or dispositions), it may be possessed but not expressed, and thus it does not imply that a being must be in an actual interpersonal relationship with someone else. Hence, even though God, being a divine person, would indeed require him to be a loving person (i.e. possess a specific intrinsic disposition to be loving), there is no further requirement for him to be in a loving relationship with two other divine persons, given the fact that being perfectly loving (and thus perfectly good) is simply a character trait (or dispositional quality) of God that is not required to be exercised (in and through standing in a loving relationship with another). Thus, the primary issue raised here is that of one not having been provided with a sufficient reason to believe that in order for a divine being to be absolutely perfect, it must love perfectly, and thus stand in an actual loving
interpersonal relationship with other individuals. In further questioning, this position, one could indeed ask why this should be so? Why should a perfectly loving being (i.e., possessing a character trait/disposition) actually be loving perfectly (i.e., performing an action)? As Tuggy (2015, 135) states:

perfection is a matter of a thing’s intrinsic condition, and so the perfection of being perfectly loving is a certain state of character . . . in principle, it seems that one can be perfectly loving without actually loving perfectly, or without ever actually loving anyone else in any way . . . surely, one can have the character trait of being fully loving without actually loving anyone beyond oneself.

Thus, according to the objection, there is no specific deficiency in God if he is not in a loving relationship, even if being so is a great good in itself—in the same manner that there is no deficiency in God if he didn’t create anything, despite the great good of doing so. Tuggy (2015, 137) expresses this point clearly in writing that “God would nonetheless, sans creation, be perfect. Not all goods, not even all great goods, are such that their absence would render one imperfect. Some goods one doesn’t need in order to be perfect.” Therefore, God would still be perfect if he did not utilise his capability to love another divine person perfectly prior to creation, in the same manner, that he would be perfectly good even if he did not utilise his capability to create. Moreover, as Tuggy (2021, 264) notes in emphasising this point, there is a further analogy here with the character trait of “friendly” where what it is to be friendly is “to be disposed, in appropriate circumstances, to enter into and remain within (at least superficial) friendships.” Hence, as Tuggy (2021, 264) writes,

Just so with the quality perfectly loving. It is having the disposition to act and react in perfectly loving ways, if and when there is another to love. In isolation, one may still be perfectly loving. At least, this is conceivable, and no one has shown it to imply a contradiction, and so to be impossible.

Thus, we do not have good reason to believe that if God exemplifies perfect love, he would be required to be performing the action of loving another perfectly in an actual interpersonal relationship—and thus him, inevitably bringing about two other divine persons in order to do so. Hence, from an a priori standpoint—that is, independent of (revelatory) experience—premise (i) of the Love Argument seems to be false. And thus, the Love Argument fails to establish the necessary truth of the doctrine of the Trinity from an a priori standpoint.

Taking this all into account, the focus of this article will be on, firstly, reformulating the metaphysical basis of the Love Argument so as to enable it to be utilised by an adherent of Latin Trinitarianism—this is the Reformulation.
Task. This task will be fulfilled by proposing a “basic” model of Latin Trinitarianism that utilises two important concepts from contemporary metaphysics: a “trope” and “(multiple) location.” More precisely, this model is basic in the sense that it will not include various other concepts that are needed to deal with certain philosophical and theological objections that can be raised against this model. These issues are dealt with in a more “robust version” of the model termed “Monarchical Aspectivalism” that was introduced in (Sijuwade, 2022). Hence, the focus of this article will thus be on establishing the following conditional conclusion: if a robust version of Latin Trinitarianism is coherent (and theologically plausible), then there is a successful Love Argument for its veracity. Thus, in reaching this end, explicating and applying the two concepts of a trope and multiple location will help to establish a foundation and framework for a “Latin” construal of the Love Argument. Moreover, this article will also focus on providing a response to the Dispositional Objection, as the specific version of the Love Argument proposed here will enable one to address this objection by it having been formulated in light of a different concept of love: agápē, which has been proposed by Alexander Pruss in the field of applied ethics. Hence, by utilising this more “robust” conception of love that is not plagued by the issues noted above, one would have strong grounds for understanding exactly why it is necessary God, if he is to exemplify this form of love, must “cause” to exist two other divine persons—without, however, the conclusion reached here having to face the Dispositional Objection. Thus, in the end, a new (problem-free) version of the Love Argument—termed the Agápēic Argument—would be ready and available to be used by an adherent of Latin Trinitarianism to argue for the veracity of this conception of the Trinity.

Thus, the plan is as follows: in section two (“Metaphysical Framework and the Concept of Love”), I explicate central notions that will be utilised in our reformulation of the Love Argument: tropes, aspects, multiple location and agápē.6 Then, in section three (“Reformulating the Love Argument”), I apply these notions to develop a Latin conception of the nature of God (i.e., the basic model) and propose a reformulation of the Love Argument that centres on the notion of agápē, which will ultimately provide a new version of the argument that fulfils the Reformulation Task (i.e., corresponds with Latin Trinitarianism) and is free from the Dispositional Objection. After this section, there will be a final section (“Conclusion”) summarising the above results and concluding the article.

2. Metaphysical Framework and the Concept of Love

6 The first adherent of Latin Trinitarianism to include the notion of multiple location in an explication of the model of the Trinity was Leftow (2004). However, in the development of his theory, Leftow was not explicit about his usage of this notion. For a more explicit usage of this notion in a Latin Trinitarian theory, see (Effingham, 2015), (Pickup, 2016) and (Sijuwade, 2022).
2.1. The Nature of Tropes, Aspects & Multiple Location

At the centre of the metaphysical framework assumed within this context are the notions of a “trope” and “multiple location.” These two concepts can be understood more precisely as follows:

(3) (Module Trope) An entity \( x \) is a module trope if \( x \) is a particularised nature that is a maximally thin object that possesses the character that it grounds.

(4) (Aspect) An entity \( x \) is an aspect if it is a qualitatively differing, numerically identical, particular way that a complete individual is.

Focusing first on (3): the notion of a “module trope,” a trope according to D.C. Williams (1953, 1986) and other trope theorists, is best construed as a “particularised nature” that, at a general level, fulfils the role of being the “basic element” or “alphabet of being” from which all other entities belonging to other ontological categories—such as objects, properties and relations etc.—are constructed from.\(^7\) Within a “trope-theoretic” framework, an important distinction has been drawn by Michael Loux (2015) and Robert K. Garcia (2015) between the conceptualisation of tropes as either modifier tropes or module tropes. At a basic level, modifier tropes and module tropes are both taken to be non-shareable, maximally-thin (i.e., singly charactered), character-grounders (Garcia, 2015)—with the central difference between these two types of tropes being that of the latter being an object that exemplifies the character that it grounds, and the former being a property that does not exemplify this character, but simply bestows it upon—that is “makes” something else to be charactered in that specific way. More precisely, a modifier trope is a singly (or minimally) characterising property, whilst a module trope is a singly (or minimally) characterised property in a “stretched” (or analogical) sense—that is it is a “propertied thing or object” (hereafter, property*).\(^8\) Hence, modifier tropes are properties that are not in any way until charactered. Rather, modifier tropes are character-makers in the

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\(^7\) At a more precise level, Williams and other trope theorists further conceive of tropes as “abstract particular natures.” However, due to the fact that unpacking the notion of abstractness (and the further elements of a modifier/module trope) will take us too far afield, the definition of a trope as a particularised nature and the (albeit brief) description of the nature of a modifier/module trope that is to follow will be sufficient to formulate the basic model needed for the argument.

\(^8\) I leave the account of analogy here undefined.
sense that they make something else (i.e., the particular object that bears the trope) charactered, but are not themselves characterized in that specific way. A modifier trope’s character-making ability is thus asymmetric, which results in the case that when a modifier trope characterizes a numerically distinct entity, then the character that is bestowed upon it is solely located at the object-level, and is thus absent at the trope level (Garcia, 2015). Thus, for example, a particular object is spherical in virtue of its modifier trope, which “spherises” that object by simply making it spherical—without it sharing in that character as well. The character grounding provided by a modifier trope is thus de novo (or sui generis) (Garcia, 2015). However, the character grounding provided by a modifier trope is to be held in distinction from a module trope, as a module trope grounds the character of something else (i.e., a particular object) through itself being characterized in that specific way as well. Collectively, module tropes ground the character of an object by the object being reducible to a “bundle” of compresent module tropes that possess this character. For module tropes, there is thus a reproduction of trope-level character at the object level and vice versa (Garcia, 2015). Thus, for example, a particular object is spherical and red in virtue of its module tropes, which are themselves spherical and red, and together (compresently) are parts (or constituents) of that object. A module tropes’ character grounding, rather than being de novo, can thus be taken to be some type of parthood (or constitution) relation (Garcia, 2015). Having laid out the notion of a trope, we can now turn our attention to (4): the notion of an aspect.

An aspect, as noted previously, is a concept that plays a key role within the context of qualitative self-differing, which we can be illustrated as follows: let’s say that there is an individual, David, who is a philosophy professor and a father. David faces a dilemma: he has a pending keynote speech for a philosophy conference, but he also promised his children, Jacob and Melissa, a camping trip for their A-level achievements. David, the dedicated professor, wants to prepare for the conference. Conversely, David, the committed Father, wants to reward his children. David is in a situation of qualitative self-differing—and it’s the notion of an aspect that can be taken to bring further light to the situation—as the conflicting desires of David do not represent David, but rather David’s two aspects—the nature of which we will need to flesh out more later. Nevertheless, we thus have a motivation in place for positing the existence of aspects within these types of qualitative self-differing scenarios (and many others).

Now, this notion of an aspect can be further elucidated at the semantic and ontological level. The semantic level highlights the use of “nominal qualifiers” like “insofar as,” “qua” or “in some respect,” which refer to aspects, particularly in self-differing cases. For precision, we can use formalisation with aspect terms like ‘a_φ(y)’. Ontologically, understanding aspects becomes clearer by defining their function and relationship to their bearers. That is, aspects represent
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individual *ways of being*—and thus, we have a connection here between the thesis of OP and that of an aspect. It is important to note, however, that aspects aren’t qualities or properties since they possess qualities due to their numerical identity to the individuals that bear them. They are not mereological parts of their bearers, nor are they mere mental abstractions. Moreover, they are entities that do not possess all the qualities their bearers have, and are not complete individuals as they are dependent on the complete individuals they represent. In all, from this negative portrayal of an aspect, one can now positively construe an aspect as a qualitatively differing, abstract entity that is numerically identical to its bearer. Moreover, it functions as the bearer’s particular way of being, is expressed through nominal qualifiers like “insofar as,” and is distinguished through aspectival distinction—that is, a distinction that picks out an aspect through nominal qualification.

With this understanding to hand, the example of David’s dilemma can be formally articulated as follows: we can represent “David as a philosopher” and “David as a father” as two numerically identical but qualitatively distinct aspects, and use the aspect terms: $\text{David}_x[y$ is a philosopher$],$ which signifies “David insofar as he is a philosopher,” and $\text{David}_x[y$ is a father$],$ which represents “David insofar as a father.” And thus, we now take it to be the case that it is $\text{David}_x[y$ is a philosopher$]$ that does not want to camp, and $\text{David}_x[y$ is a father$]$ that does want to camp. While at face value, these seem contradictory, however, the nominal qualification used here actually removes the explicit contradiction. For instance, $\text{David}_x[y$ is a philosopher$]$ may not wish to camp, but this doesn’t mean David, unqualified, feels the same. Aspects ensure there’s no contradiction in such cases. There is thus a blocking of the *secundum quid ad simpliciter inference* expressed ($\neg(\forall x)(F(x[w(y)]) \rightarrow F(x))$) in an aspectival context, which means that just because an aspect of a complete individual is a certain way, it doesn’t also mean the individual unqualifiedly is that way. Furthermore, every aspect is numerically identical to a complete individual—such that, for David, both his philosopher and father aspects are identical to him and to each other. This highlights how an individual can possess multiple, numerically identical but qualitatively differing aspects. Now, this all seems to be conceptually coherent; however, a pertinent issue appears to be in sight—namely, the potential transgression of Leibniz’s Law (i.e., the Indiscernibility of Identicals: $\forall x\forall y(x = y \rightarrow (F(x) \leftrightarrow F(y)))$, which states that if $x$ is numerically identical with $y$, then for any quality $F$, $F$ is possessed by $x$ if and only if it is possessed by $y$. Within an aspectival framework, numerically identical entities might not share the same qualities, which seemingly violates Leibniz’s Law. However, Baxter (2018) argues aspects allow contradictories to be predicated of the same entity in ways that Leibniz’s Law doesn’t address. That is, one can ask why should Leibniz’s Law universally apply without exceptions? Baxter (2016) observes that a common concern is that relations not governed by
Leibniz’s Law aren’t identity. The main reason for this belief is the idea that entities can’t both have and lack a property, ensuring no contradictions exist in reality. Leibniz’s Law and the Principle of Non-Contradiction are often treated equivalently. Yet, Baxter (2018) notes that the core of the latter principle is that nothing both has and lacks a property in the same way at the same time. This allows for something to have a property in one respect and lacks it in another without contradiction. And thus, there’s no reason to believe Leibniz’s Law applies universally. Hence, one can differentiate between a version of Leibniz’s Law for complete entities (individuals): \((\forall x \forall y (x = y \rightarrow (F(x) \leftrightarrow F(y))))\), which starts that if \(x\) is numerically identical with \(y\), then for any quality \(F\), \(F\) is possessed by \(x\) if and only if it is possessed by \(y\). And a version of Leibniz’s Law for aspects (incomplete entities): \(\exists x \forall y (x = y \rightarrow (\forall F)(F(zk[Xk]) \leftrightarrow F(wk[Yk])))\), which states that if \(x\) is numerically identical with \(y\), then for any quality \(F\), an aspect numerically identical with \(x\) has it if and only if an aspect numerically identical with \(y\) has it. Aspects do not oppose the Indiscernibility of Identical Individuals, which remains silent on aspects. The issue thus lies with the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects. Identicals unqualifiedly are indiscernible, but qualifiedly might be discernible. Non-contradictory internal negation suggests Leibniz’s Law doesn’t necessarily apply to aspects. For instance, entities referred to by “David, [y is a father]” (David insofar as he is a father) aren’t the complete individual but aspects. Off of this, one can distinguish between “aspectival reference” (a reference to aspects) and “singular reference” (a reference to complete entities). And it is singular reference that isn’t sensitive to aspectival differences. Leibniz’s Law, in its original sense, includes all complete entities but not the incomplete entities numerically identical to some of them. Thus, Leibniz’s Law doesn’t prevent numerically identical aspects from being qualitatively different. Hence, by being committed to the existence of aspects, it does not require that one reject Leibniz’s Law outright—only an unrestricted understanding of Leibniz’s Law that encompasses both complete and incomplete entities. Specifically, one only transgresses Leibniz’s Law when taken as both the Indiscernibility of Identical Individuals and the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects. Leibniz’s Law, thus, doesn’t necessarily apply to aspects, making it feasible to posit the existence of numerically identical yet qualitatively differing aspects. We can now turn our attention to explicating the nature of (5): the notion of multiple location, which we can state succinctly as follows:

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(5) \text{(Multiple Location)} \quad \text{An entity } x \text{ is multi-located if there are two or more distinct regions in that } x \text{ is exactly located at (i.e., is contained in and completely fills).}
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In understanding the notion of multiple location, it is important to first grasp the more fundamental notion of a “chorological system.” A chorological system is a system concerning location. Following Antony Eagle (2010, 2016), we can utilise a specific chorological system that takes the relation of “occupation” as primitive. The locution “occupies,” however, is used in such a way that an entity is taken to occupy a region if that entity can (in whole or in part) be found at that region (Eagle, 2010). Hence, if an entity can be found at a region, then that is not completely free of that entity. This can thus be illustrated in Figure 1. through the following example provided by Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi (2020, 1067):

As can be seen here, Circle “occupies” regions R1 – R4, but not R5—as Circle can be found in R1-R4 (and thus these regions are not completely free of it), but it cannot be found in R5 (and thus this region is completely free of it). From this basic gloss of the occupation relation, one can thus define two further important notions introduced by Eagle (2016, 511–512): containment and filling. For containment, an entity x is contained in a region R iff each (proper or improper) part of x occupies a subregion of R. And, for filling, an entity x fills region R iff each subregion of R overlaps the occupied location of x. Taking these notions into account, one can now provide a construal of the chorological relation of “exact location,” which is that of an entity being exactly located at a region if it (occupies) is found at that region—which is now that of it being contained in and

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9 The nature of a region is allowed to be left open within this chorological system—that is, a region that is occupied could be

10 This notion of occupation and exact location thus corresponds to Josh Parsons’ (2007) important notion of “weak location”.

11 I add here the additional distinction between proper and improper parts to allow mereological simples, tropes and other entities that lack proper parts (but have improper parts) to occupy regions.
completely filling that region. More precisely, an entity $x$ is exactly located at a region $R$ by $R$ being contained and filled by $x$. So, for example, a person is contained in their house, because each of their parts occupies their house. However, if the person was halfway out of their door, they could still be found in their house, but they would not be contained there, as some of their parts would be outside of that region. Moreover, that person does not fill their house, because some subregions of their house are free of them. However, their exact location is a region in which they fill and are contained—that is, the region of one’s body is their location. For another illustration, we can return to our previous example, Circle is contained in $R_3$ and $R_4$, and not that of $R_1$, $R_2$ and $R_5$, as some of its (proper) parts are outside of the latter regions. Furthermore, Circle fills $R_1$ and $R_4$, but not that of $R_2$, $R_3$ and $R_5$, as some of the subregions of these regions are free of this object (Costa and Calosi, 2020). Importantly, however, nothing in this chorological system commits one to the “uniqueness” of locations, and thus this system is compatible with the possibility of multiple location. As Eagle (2010, 55, emphasis added) importantly writes,

This possibility arises because of the way that containment is defined; as it stands, an object can be contained in $R$ if all of its parts are in $R$, whether or not those parts are also elsewhere. It seems perfectly intuitive to me that containment involves the object being (to use Parson’s terminology) wholly within a region (every part of the object is in the region), whether or not it might also be entirely within that region (everywhere disjoint from the region is free of the object).12

So, on the basis of this conceptualisation of the relation of occupation, and now the further notion of exact location that is grounded on this relation, to say that a given object is “multiply located” is simply to say that it is exactly located at more than one (disjoint) region.13 More precisely, the notion of multiple location can be defined, in line with Hud Hudson (2005), as follows: “$x$ multiply locates” $df.$ (i) $x$ is an entity that occupies (i.e., is contained in and completely fills) more than one region, and (ii) $x$ is not located at the fusion of the regions at which $x$ is located.14 Given that the notion of multiple location is centred on the chorological relation

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12 Exact location is thus not to be incorrectly interpreted as entire location (which would require one to be solely located in one region). This interpretative connection between these two terms is affirmed in Parsons (2007), but is not in the chorological system under study (namely that of Eagle’s). It is also important to remember that the parts that are relevant to the notion of containment can be proper parts or improper parts.

13 For an extensive argument in support of the possibility of multiple location, see (Eagle, 2016).

14 In (i) of Hudson’s (2005) own definition of multiple location, there is an assumption that “$x$ is a material object”; however, as this is an assumption made in order to fit with Hudson’s own metaphysical system—which is not assumed here—we will proceed forward with the more general term “entity,” which leaves it open whether this entity is material or immaterial.
of occupation and exact location, there is nothing in particular that prevents an entity from being contained, and also fill, more than one region. Hence, in following Gilmore (2018, §6), we can illustrate in Figure 2. the inner workings of this notion of multiple location through the following paradigm example (with the left image representing a scattered, single-located object and the right image presenting a non-scattered, multiply-located object):

![Diagram of multiple location](image)

**Figure 2. Nature of Multiple Location**

In this paradigm example, object $o_1$ is a scattered entity due to its shape being that of the sum of the two disjoint circles (Gilmore 2018). This type of entity is thus not multiply located as it is exactly located at one region: the scattered region $r_3$—and thus, this region is not free of this entity. However, object $o_2$ is, in fact, multiply located as it is exactly located at (solely) two regions—it is exactly located at region $r_3$ and the (disjoint) region $r_4$ and thus—in assuming the construal of occupation and exact location noted above—as $o_2$ occupies is exactly located at $r_3$ and $r_4$, it is contained in both—as each part of the $o_2$ occupies a subregion of both $r_3$ and $r_4$—and it also fills both $r_3$ and $r_4$—as each subregion of both is occupied by $o_2$. Thus, this object can be found in each of these regions—which is to say that each of these regions is not free of this entity.\(^{15}\) Given the overly abstract nature of this example, it will be helpful to focus on another more familiar type of entity—namely, that of immanent universals—which will help to further illustrate the position proposed here.\(^{16}\) Immanent universals are usually taken to be entities that occupy the regions that their instances occupy. In particular, suppose that being negatively charged is a universal that is instantiated by some certain electrons, then it will be the case that this universal is an entity that occupies each of the many regions that are occupied by some

\(^{15}\) Moreover, the union of $r_3$ and $r_4$ is not a region which contains $o_2$.

\(^{16}\) Further familiar examples can also be adduced, such as that of enduring entities and time-travelling persons.
electron or other (Gilmore, 2006). Hence, as was seen with our previous example, it is thus not obviously impossible for an entity to be multiply located—that is, to be exactly located at two or more (disjoint) regions.\textsuperscript{17} Given all of this, exact location is thus not a one-one relation, but a many-one relation, where a single object can be exactly located at more than one (disjoint) region at the same time.

In summary, a trope is a particularised nature that either can be modular—a self-exemplifying, maximally-thinly characted property* (i.e. an object) or, it can be a modifier, a non-self-exemplifying, maximally-thinly characterising property. Entities (such as an object) can also have aspects, which are qualitatively differing, yet numerically identical ways that an entity is. Moreover, an entity (such as an object) can be multiply located by being exactly located at more than one disjoint region. On the basis of this clarification of the notion of tropes, aspects and multiple location, we can now turn our attention towards explicating the concept of love that will play an important role in our reformulation of the Love Argument.

2.2. The Nature of Agápē

According to Alexander Pruss (2008, 2013a),\textsuperscript{18} the notion of agápē is at the heart of a loving (“agapeic”) relationship between two individuals: the lover and the beloved. Given the importance of this notion within this context, we can understand its nature more specifically as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(6)] \textbf{(Agápē)}
\item[(i)] \textit{Determination}: A determination of the will of an individual in favour of the beloved
\item[(ii)] \textit{Forms}: A multi-formed concept with three interrelated elements: a complacent element, a benevolence element and a unitive element.
\end{enumerate}

In further grasping the nature of (5), one can first understand that within this agápēic framework, the various forms of love—filial, romantic or fraternal love, etc.—are all forms of agápē. That is, in Pruss’ (2013a) thought, agápē is not a distinct type of love alongside the other forms of love; rather, it simply \textit{is} love, a multi-formed love. More specifically, this multi-formedness of agápē is grounded

\textsuperscript{17} It is also not obviously impossible for a multi-located entity to fail to occupy the union of its locations. I will leave it to the reader to work out how this additional point holds as well.

\textsuperscript{18} Pruss (2013a) introduces this specific theory/conceptualisation of love within the applied sexual ethics context. However, this specific theory is not wholly wedded to this context, and thus, we are able to extract it from that context and apply it to the task at hand.
upon two factors: linguistic and theological.\footnote{Despite the notion of agápē here being grounded on the New Testament, this does not render the Love Argument that is to be formulated as \textit{a posteriori} rather than \textit{a priori}, based on the fact that the reasoning \textit{from} the notion of agápē—that has as its foundation the New Testament—to the necessity of the Trinity is a wholly \textit{a priori} exercise based on the nature of God.} Linguistically, within the New Testament, all “types” of love are forms of agápē in the sense that the word has a very wide range of meaning, such that spousal love (Ephesians 5:25), sexualised love (Song of Songs 2:5), and even love for certain possessions—such as the love for the best seats in the synagogue (Luke 11:43)—are all referred to as agápē (Pruss, 2013a). In short, the New Testament usage of agápē appears to have a semantic range that corresponds to that of the English word “love” (Pruss, 2013a). Moreover, at a theological level within the New Testament, all ‘types’ of love are forms of agápē in the sense that the love that humanity is to have for God and for their neighbour (Matthew 5:44), and the love that God has for humanity (John 3:16), is regularly referred to as agápē—and is expressed as a selfless generosity that is directed towards the other and desires reciprocation for the good of the other (Pruss, 2013a). Given this wide range of linguistic and theological usage, the scriptural understanding of agápē does not distinguish it from other forms of love; rather, it presents the forms of love as unified forms of agápē—every love is agápē, a multi-formed love. Hence, at a conceptual level, agápē is best conceived of as a multi-formed love that is a \textit{determination of the will of an individual in favour of the beloved}. That is, agápē is thus a concept that is \textit{connected to action}—it guarantees right action—and thus, individuals are responsible for love, rather than being passive receivers of it (Pruss, 2013a). To fulfil this responsibility, one must love by willing the good for the beloved—for their sake, rather than one’s own—but also one must appreciate and value the beloved and seek union with them. More specifically, there are three elements of all forms of agápē: a “complacent” element, a “benevolence” element and a “unitive” element.\footnote{Pruss (2013a) conceives of the first element of agápē as being that of “appreciation” rather than that of a “complacent” element. However, as I see the former as being included in the latter, I will proceed forward with this specific conception of the first element of agápē. Importantly, however, the word “complacent” used in the text does not refer to our modern understanding of the word which signifies one showing smug oneself or one’s achievements. Rather, it is to be understood in the historical (scholastic) theological sense of “\textit{amor complacentiae}” in Latin, which signifies a kind of appreciate love that finds delight or pleasure in the goodness or beauty of the object loved, independent of any benefit the lover might receive.} Unpacking this in more detail: first, agápēic love has a complacent element—and thus is a “complacent love”—in the sense that it is a love that respects and appreciates the intrinsic worth or value of the beloved, in a manner that reflects and honours their worth or value. Second, agápēic love has a benevolence element—and thus is a “benevolent love”—in the sense that it seeks to bestow what is good on another individual and prevent/alleviate what
is bad for another individual—not, however, because the beloved has earned it or deserves it but simply because the beloved’s welfare is valued for its own sake. That is, benevolence is an element of *agápē* that bestows worth on all individuals and is not motivated by the particular moral status or worth of a given beloved but is a free gift that is bestowed on them in virtue of who the lover is. Third, *agápēc* love has a unitive element—and thus is a “unitive love”—in the sense that it is a love that seeks union. That is, the lover seeks, mentally and/or physically, to “become one” with the beloved—in a dual-manner that will be further explained below. Now, these three elements of *agápē* are interconnected as follows: a complacent love for the beloved would result in a recognition that it is right to bestow goods on them through acts of will (Pruss, 2013a). Moreover, exemplifying a complacent love for the beloved would lead to one seeking union with them in such a way that the beloved’s good becomes that of the lover’s good as well (Pruss, 2013a). By one being benevolent towards the beloved, and thus willing the good for the beloved for their sake, one would value them as an individual upon whom it is appropriate to bestow goods upon, and one would also be united with the beloved in will, given that the beloved would also will the good for themselves. Additionally, by one aiming for an intimate form of union, where one would treat the good and bad experiences that befall the beloved as befalling themselves, it would thus be natural that the lover would have complacent love towards the beloved, expressed by them appreciating the beloved as one who is worthwhile of experiencing the good, resulting in one naturally having a benevolent love for them, and thus willing the good for the beloved (Pruss, 2013a). These three elements of *agápē* provide a basis for there to be a selfless and generative love between the lover and the beloved. Moreover, all the various forms of *agápē*—all the various types of *agápēc* relationships—will include these three elements within them, yet they will be manifested in different ways. That is, each form of love—self, romantic, filial and fraternal love, etc.—will exhibit, in distinct ways, a complacent love for the beloved, a benevolent love for them, and a striving for some form of union with them. Precisely, the differentiation between the forms of *agápē* will be distinguishable by the type of union that one is impelled to enter into: *formal union* and/or *real union*—with the type of union that is appropriate between the lover and the beloved depending, in part, on the characteristics of the individuals (Pruss, 2013a).

The formal union between a lover and their beloved is a *union of mind and will*. This union of mind and will consists of a mutual “indwelling” of the lover and beloved—even in the cases of unreciprocated love. In this mutual indwelling, the lover has the beloved “living within their mind” and strives to understand the

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21 Despite love being such as to include a determination of the will that involves appreciation, goodwill and union, it is important to note that love is not experienced as these distinct features, but is a single thing (Pruss, 2013a, 24).
nature and goals of the beloved from their perspective—understanding the beloved from the inside—which leads to a willing of the other’s particular good and the performance of actions for the sake of the lover as if the beloved were the lover themselves (Pruss, 2013a). In a certain way, love is ek-static, in the sense that through their union, the lover comes to live outside of themselves and in the lover. Hence, in a loving relationship, the lover dwells in the beloved intellectually and in will, and, in turn, the beloved dwells in the lover intellectually and in will as well (Pruss, 2013a). There is thus a formal union that can be increased as one gains a better knowledge of the beloved—enabling the lover to understand what is good and bad for this particular beloved and understand them better from their own point of view. Moreover, one’s will is united with the beloved by willing the good for them, and thus, this formal union is derivable from the appreciative and benevolent elements of love and is, therefore, always present in every case of love. Formal union is present simply in virtue of one loving another, and thus can exist without reciprocation, as Pruss writes, “formal union is already achieved at any time love is there . . . formal union can exist without any reciprocation” (Pruss, 2013a, 32). However, the love that is present in a relationship nevertheless impels one toward real union. Real union is thus the external expression of the formal union between the lover and the beloved. That is, real union is the way that the lover and the beloved, who are each united in mind and will, are together in a particular manner that is determined by the nature of the form of love that is present (Pruss, 2013a). Real union is the reciprocation of love that achieves an additional union between the lover and their beloved through a shared activity. Agápē thus makes an individual seek real union with another, with the specific form of real union that is sought being the primary distinguishing factor between the different forms of agápē. For example, filial love might require physical touch—such as hugging a child—whilst the friendly love between two colleagues might not call for this expression of their union—where an intellectual conversation might be more appropriate for this type of relationship (Pruss, 2008).

The love between people must thus take on a form that is appropriate to the lover, the beloved and their relationship, with some type of real union being paradigmatic of the form of love between them. Love, construed as agápē, thus must be dynamic and responsive to the reality of the beloved, which results in it taking on a form that is determinative of the manner in which the lover and the beloved express the union between them (Pruss, 2013a). More specifically, agápē has many general forms—e.g. self-love, romantic love, filial love and fraternal love—however, these forms also have various sub-forms—e.g. the romantic love between newly-weds of such-and-such an age, and the romantic love between a

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22 More on this notion below.
husband and a wife of such-and-such an age who have been married for such-and-such number of years. In a loving relationship, one is thus required to be sensitive to the situation that they are in and the person with whom they are in a relationship, which will be the basis for the form, or sub-form, of love that is instantiated within the relationship. Thus, as Pruss (2008, §3) importantly notes:

The form of love appropriate between two young and healthy newly-weds and expressed through a companionship that is both sexual and otherwise needs to be different from the form of love expressed by an elderly person’s changing the soiled underclothes of a bed-ridden spouse. Yet there is a continuity: the couple hasn’t lost their love, but their romantic love has matured to a different form or, better, sub-form.

Thus, agápē does not change forms, but is dynamic in such a sense that the sub-forms of a particular form of love, and the manner in which their union is expressed, can change, dependent on the characteristics of the individuals within the relationship. Nevertheless, what would not be changeable within an agápēic relationship would be the fact that the achievement of a real union between the lover and their beloved will have an external expression—a “consummation” of the form of love that is present. Paradigmatically, the consummation of a real union would thus be a shared activity that expresses the distinctiveness of the type of relationship that is present and enables the love to be fulfilled with respect to the particular form that it takes. The unitive element of love is thus fulfilled by this consummation, which includes—in all forms of love—a psychological union, and for a specific form of love—romantic love—a physical union as well.23 However, a hypothetical objector to the position that has been reached here can indeed raise the question of whether the unitive element of love can be fulfilled, and, thus, the relationship that is present, be consummated, in a self-love context? More specifically, is “self-love,” in fact, a form of agápē that cannot exhibit this unitive characteristic? As within a self-love context, it is presumably easy to understand what it means for one to exhibit the elements of valuing/appreciation and the willing of one’s own good. However, it is indeed challenging to understand what it means to have, or at least strive for (formal and/or real) union with oneself. As it seems to be the case that union is only possible between two distinct entities. Yet, one cannot be distinct from oneself. And thus, one cannot be (formally and/or really) united with oneself. Given this, our hypothetical objector can state that our assumption that all the distinct forms of love are all simply forms of agápē, seems to be incorrect, as the unitive elements of love cannot be exhibited within this specific self-love context. Or, is that so? As there

23 However, this “physical union” will be taken below to be expressive of solely the human sub-form of the romantic form of love.
is a plausible means of dealing with this issue that has been proposed by Eleonore Stump (2010, 100) in a related context, where she states:

This objection . . . fails to take account of the fact that a person can be divided against herself. She can lack internal integration in her mind, and the result will be that she is, as we say, double-minded. She can also lack whole-heartedness or integration in the will. Aquinas describes a person who lacks internal integration in the will as someone who wills and does not will the same thing, in virtue of willing incompatible things, or in virtue of failing to will what she wills to will. There is no union with herself for such a person.

Thus, taking our leave from Stump, the possibility of achieving a formal and/or real union with oneself is possible if we understand this as a striving for internal integration. Thus, self-love is an appreciation and valuing of oneself, the willing of good for oneself and a striving for formal and/or real union with oneself—understood now as a striving for the internal integration of oneself. The unitive element of agápē is thus present within a self-love context in cases of “internal disintegration.” Self-love, as with all forms of agápē, is one that can indeed be consummated through the expression and fulfilment of an integrated union with oneself. Taking all of these things into account, we can thus illustrate the central elements of the notion of agápē through Figure 2., where these elements being taken as essential components of this specific conception of love:24

These are the basic elements of the notion of agápē. It will be helpful to now focus our attention on a certain form of love: romantic love, which will play an important role in helping us to reformulate the Love Argument.

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24 And thus, if one of these elements is missing in a relationship, then it is not an agápēic (love) relationship.
Romantic Love, as with all the other forms of \textit{agápē}, is a form of love that includes an appreciation and valuing of the beloved, a will to further the beloved’s good, a formal union between the lover and the beloved and a striving for a real union between them. These elements, as noted previously, are thus present across the different forms of love. And thus, the means by which one can distinguish romantic love from the other forms of love is the distinctive type of real union that is consummated in it—the directedness towards procreative “one body” union. This directedness is definitive of romantic love, as Pruss (2013a, 146) writes:

\begin{quote}
It is highly plausible that romantic love involves a desire for a sexual union as one body—for a total sharing, total union, at the bodily level. But this union is constituted, I have argued, by a mutual biological striving for reproduction. In desiring union, the members of the couple implicitly desire the biological striving that constitutes it.
\end{quote}

The deep longing for union that is present within romantic love provides the grounds for the position that if this type of union is possible in sexual activity, then this union as one body is what romantic love would thus seek to instantiate (Pruss, 2013a). Therefore, the real union exhibited in a genuine case of romantic love is best understood as a functional and organic union as “one body”—a sexual activity involving an “organic union.” More precisely, the sexual union that is exhibited in romantic love is very much like the kind of functional organic unity of body parts. At a more general bio-physical level, organic union requires coordination between the actively functioning parts of a body and the striving of these parts for a common goal (Pruss, 2008). The functioning parts of the body are thus interconnected by their coordinated striving for a common purpose. For example, an organism’s heart and arteries are organically united due to the fact of them cooperating with one another to fulfil the goal of oxygenating the body of the organism. The organic union of parts, according to Pruss (2013a), is thus best defined as the parts striving together for a common purpose. Analogously, the sexual union between the lover and beloved is that of a physical striving for the procreation of a new human person. This striving is expressed through the biological, sexual activity of intercourse, and thus, in this sense, the lover and beloved are united as “one flesh” through this reproductive striving. In a sexual union, two persons are united in a totality that involves them as persons and physical, embodied beings (Pruss, 2008). The real union present within romantic love is thus \textit{sexual union}, which is a union of the lover and beloved as “one organism” and “one body/flesh” in a manner that is analogous to the union between the distinct biological parts of an organism (Pruss, 2008). Thus, in short, the union present in romantic love is thus akin to the way in which the parts of a human
body are united at a biophysical level—just as the body is unified by its cooperative activity for a common purpose, lovers are also united by their cooperative activity for a common purpose. However, if the union is to be a good and significant one, then the goal that is striven for will need to be valuable and of proportionate significance. Thus, it is the common striving for a significant purpose: the biological striving for reproduction, which results in the lover and beloved being one body. This sexual union, construed as the functional union of the lover and the beloved as one body, is constituted by a mutual striving for reproduction that is cooperative and mutually regulated by the individuals in love (Pruss, 2013a). Reproduction is thus the biological goal of the union present in romantic love, and this goal, and the striving for it, are in and of themselves goods to be sought, due to the fact that the couple, by achieving this union, is able to instantiate a richly layered union: a higher-level psychological union and a lower-level biological union—with the “lower-level” activity of the lovers being biologically directed at the procreation of offspring and the “higher-level” activity directed at the physical, emotional, moral, intellectual, and spiritual care of the offspring (Pruss, 2013a).

Romantic love thus produces the deepest possible union at all levels of the person. However, the depth of the union that is exhibited in romantic love is not temporally limited. Romantic love seeks its consummation, but also seeks a union that is extendable across time, with a way to extend this union is through an act of commitment being made by the persons striving to achieve the goal of reproduction (Pruss, 2013a). However, this reproductive striving would then, in turn, continue in the lovers’ mutual contribution in caring for and educating their offspring. Thus, as Pruss (2013a, 169) notes, “a joint commitment to reproducing and raising children when and if that becomes possible, morally licit, and prudent can bind them together, in a way that extends the biological union interpersonally and in time.” Therefore, despite the temporal nature of sexual union, the presence of a normative commitment made by the persons in the relationship can enable the momentary sexual union to be temporally extended, resulting in the union as one body being able, to some extent, persist outside of the sexual act (Pruss, 2013a).

One could raise the natural objection to the claim that human sexual intercourse involves directedness towards procreation, as one might say that human sexual intercourse can be perfect in itself without having that directiveness, as many who seek to avoid that consequence of their sexual intercourse claim. In response to this objection, one can say, as Pruss (2013a) did, a striving for procreation allows the couple to aim for a goal that is unitive at all levels, which is thus significantly valuable. Partaking in sexual intercourse that lacks this striving is thus valuable to a limited extent, as it does not enable a couple to achieve the deepest integrative union possible. As agapeic love is realised within a relation through union (appreciation and benevolence), one should desire to achieve the best form of this union, which is a union as one body that is grounded on a striving for procreation. I will like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
In summary, \( \textit{agápê} \) is a multi-formed love that is a determination of the will of an individual in favour of the beloved that has complacent, benevolent and unitive elements. Furthermore, romantic love is a form of \( \textit{agápê} \) that is distinguishable from all other forms through the type of real union that is appropriate to it: sexual union. This sexual union, in an analogous manner to biological union, is a functional, organic union of the lover and their beloved as one body. In romantic love, the lovers are thus one body through a common physical striving for reproduction, which produces the deepest union possible, with the further possibility of a normative commitment being made to one another, which provides a temporal extension of this organic union through time. We can now focus our attention on applying the notions of a module trope, multiple location and \( \textit{agápê} \) to the task, so as to reformulate the Love Argument as the \( \textit{Agápêic} \) Argument.

3. Reformulating the Love Argument

3.1. God as a Multiply-Located Trope

In fulfilling the Reformulation Task—namely, that of developing a Love Argument within a Latin Trinitarian framework—we take God to be identified as a module trope that is multiply located. We can state this conceptualisation of the nature of God more succinctly as follows:

\[(7) \text{ (Concept of God)} \quad \text{God is a module trope (i.e., particularised nature of modular kind) that is multiply located by him being exactly located at three (disjoint) regions—in which he is “the Father,” “the Son” and “the Spirit” at each of these respective regions.}\]

In further explicating this conception of God, we can first understand that God is to be identified as a module trope. As a module trope, God is a particularised nature of a modular kind. That is, God is a module trope, rather than a modifier trope, which is that of him being a maximally-thinly charactered object—a property in an analogous sense (i.e. a property*)—that is self-exemplifying and, in assuming Christian Theism, serves the role of bestowing this characteristic upon “the Trinity” which he constitutes. That is, God is a maximally-thinly charactered property*, due to the fact that God possesses, or more specifically is identical to, the single-character of omnipotence—which is that of him having the ability to actualise any logically possible state of affairs. God is thus maximally-thinly charactered in the sense of him being charactered as an “omnipotence-
trope.” Thus, God is a module trope—he is numerically identically to a particularised nature of a modular kind—without, however, any limitations. In short, God is a trope without any arbitrary limits to its power—an omnipotence-trope, which can be illustrated through Figure 3. as follows:

Figure 4. God and Module Trope Identity

As an omnipotence-trope, God is a personal entity that is infinite in knowledge, freedom and goodness. That is, it follows from his omnipotence that God would, firstly, be perfectly free—free from any non-rational influence determining the choices that he makes. Furthermore, as an omnipotence-trope, God would, secondly, also know the nature of the alternative actions that he can choose from, and thus, he would be omniscient—he would know of all true propositions that they are true. Being omniscient and perfectly free, God would, thirdly, also be perfectly good—he will always perform the best action (or kind of action), if there is one, many good actions and no bad actions. Given God’s omniscience, he would know the nature of each available action that he can choose from and thus would possess knowledge of whether each action is good or bad, or is better than some incompatible action. Moreover, in recognising an action as good, God would have some motivation to perform that action, and in recognising an action as being better than another action, God would have an even greater motivation to perform it (Swinburne, 2016). Nonetheless, there also will be scenarios in which God is presented with a choice between an infinite number of incompatible possible actions (or kinds of actions) for him to perform—each of which is less good than some other action (or kind of action) that he could perform—yet there is no best action (or kind of action) for him to perform (Swinburne, 2018). For example, suppose that it is the best possible kind of action to create universes, then God will be presented with a choice to create a universe, and the action of creating universes would be a better action the more universes that God created. For states of affairs such as these, God’s perfect goodness will thus be exemplified by him choosing to perform one of these actions—choosing
to create one universe—though his choice to perform this particular action would not be best—as there is no best possible action (Swinburne, 2018). Hence, given the exemplification of perfect freedom, if God is situated in a scenario in which there is the best possible action (or best kind of action) for him to perform, then God will always perform that action (or kind of action). Thus, within the current framework, God is identified as a module trope; however, he is not one that is exactly located solely at one location (region). Rather, God is multiply located in the sense that he is exactly located at more than one disjoint region—God is exactly located at three (disjoint) regions.\(^{26}\)

More specifically, within the present chorological system, we take the chorological relation of occupation as basic, and thus state the multiple locations that God is at (occupies) as such: first, God is exactly located at region \(r_1\)—which is to say that God can be found at \(r_1\) (this region is not free of him) and thus he is contained in this region by each (proper or improper) part of him occupying a subregion of \(r_1\), and he fills this region by each subregion of \(r_1\) overlapping the occupied location of him. Second, God is exactly located at region \(r_2\)—which is to say that God can be found at \(r_2\) (this region is not free of him), and thus he is contained in this region by each (proper or improper) part of him occupying a subregion of \(r_2\), and he fills this region by each subregion of \(r_2\) overlapping the occupied location of him. And, third, God is exactly located at region \(r_3\)—which is to say that God can be found at \(r_3\) (this region is not free of him), and thus he is contained in this region by each (proper or improper) part of him occupying a subregion of \(r_3\), and he fills this region by each subregion of \(r_3\) overlapping the occupied location of him.\(^{27}\) Hence, as a multiply located entity, God has three locations. For a visual heuristic, we can illustrate in Figure 4. this case of multiple location as such:

\(^{26}\) Importantly, this does not mean that God is not omnipresent—that is, present everywhere—once one takes into account an important distinction introduced by Ross Inman (2017) between fundamental presence—which is that of an object being exactly located at a region in their own right—and derivative presence—which is that of an object being located at a region by being causally and/or cognitively connected to another individual that is exactly located at a region in their own right. Thus, God is taken to be here solely exactly located at three regions fundamentally—whilst still being omnipresent by him being located at every other existing region derivatively—that is, by him being causally and/or cognitively connected to every other individual that is exactly located at a given region, on the basis of his omnipotence and omniscience.

\(^{27}\) I also make a distinction here between proper and improper parts. An individual who affirms divine simplicity can take God to possess “improper parts,” and one who denies this can take God to possess “proper parts.” For an explanation of how divine simplicity allows God to have improper parts, see (Sijuwade, 2021b).
Despite God being exactly located at disjoint regions, he is numerically identical across the regions, and thus, there is the self-same entity (i.e., singular subsisting entity) at each region. Now, in identifying the persons of the Trinity within this framework, as a multiply located entity can bear different characteristics at each of its different regions, one can take, first, God *insofar as* he is exactly located at $r_1$ (i.e., is contained in and fills region $r_1$) to be identified as the Father (with him bearing whatever individuating factor that is necessary to be the Father—and a specific factor that renders him as a “person”—at that specific region). Second, God *insofar as* he is exactly located at $r_2$ (i.e., is contained in and fills region $r_2$) to be identified as the Son (with him bearing whatever individuating factor that is necessary to be the Son—and a specific factor that renders him as a “person”—at that specific region). And, third, God *insofar as* he is exactly located at $r_3$ (i.e., is contained in and fills region $r_3$) to be identified as the Spirit (with him bearing whatever individuating factor that is necessary to be the Spirit—and a specific factor that renders him as a “person”—at that specific region). Each of the members of the Trinity is thus to be identified as God *insofar as* he is exactly located at a certain region—with each being numerically identical to God and one

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The potential individuating factors of each of the persons of the Trinity would be that of the fulfilment and of certain “onto-thematic” roles. And the factor that renders each of them as “persons” in their respective regions is that of bearing a *first-person perspective*—which is necessary and sufficient for being a person. For more on this, the nature of onto-thematic roles and first-person perspectives, and their application within a Trinitarian context, see the robust model featured in (Sijuwade, 2022).
another. And how there can be qualitatively distinct entities that are nevertheless numerically identical, is through there being “location-specific” aspects at each of the regions where God is exactly located that enable him to bear certain qualities and stand in relations that individuate him at each region as the Father, the Son and the Spirit. That is, as each of the members of the Trinity is thus to be identified as God insofar as it is exactly located at a certain spatial region, the members of the Trinity are aspects that are numerically identical to God and each other — without, however, this resulting in them having the same qualities as each other — which will keep any issue of “patриpassianism” at bay. That is, the Father is a qualitatively differing aspect of God, the Son is a qualitatively differing aspect of God, and the Spirit is a qualitatively differing aspect of God. Yet, at the bottom level, they are each simply God, despite there being a qualitative distinction between them. So, again, for heuristic purposes, we can illustrate this aspectival distinction as such (with “A” standing for an “aspect”):

More can, and indeed needs to be said concerning the specific conception of Latin Trinitarianism that is being assumed here; however, given our assumption of the basic model for our task, the necessary metaphysical foundation has now been established for reformulating the Love Argument.

3.2. The Agápēic Argument for the Trinity

In proceeding forward in our reformulation of the Love Argument — termed the Agápēic Argument — we can apply the notions of a module trope, multiple location and agápē within this specific theological context and thus now re-state the original Love Argument featured in (1) through the following syllogism:
In understanding the nature of this argument, it will now be helpful to proceed in a stepwise manner by first seeing how there is a requirement for God to necessarily “cause” to exist an additional divine person. And then proceed to show that there is also a further requirement for God, with the second divine person, to “bring about” an additional divine person. In reaching this conclusion, it would thus be the case that the necessity of a Latin conception of the Trinity can indeed be established from an a priori standpoint, without, however, the conclusion reached by this argument being subject to the Dispositional Objection.

As noted previously, God is identified as an omnipotence-trope—that is, a trope that can actualise any state of affairs that is logically possible for it to actualise. Hence, whether God does, in fact, actualise a given state of affairs that is logically possible for him to do will depend on whether he chooses to do so or not. Yet, given the exemplification of perfect freedom, if God is situated in a scenario in which there is a unique best action (or best kind of action) for him to perform, then God will inevitably perform that action (or kind of action) as an act of essence (i.e. a necessary act of his nature). Now, how one can acquire knowledge concerning God’s intentions is by assessing whether the purported intended act is a morally good act. That is, given our understanding of God’s perfect goodness, we can ascertain knowledge concerning the type of aims and actions that God would fulfil and perform—with an action that seems to be a unique best action (i.e. a sensible, appropriate, reasonable/rational action) being one that we can judge that God would inevitably perform. One action that God can perform that is of this nature is that of him exemplifying agápēc love for himself—that is, God would exemplify self-love. Self-love, as with all other forms of agápē, has three intertwined elements: complacent love, benevolence, and a striving for union—a formal union and a real union. God’s complacent love for himself is a recognition and respecting of the infinite intrinsic worth of God, and a love that God has for his own essence. And God’s benevolence for himself is

29 With the notion of causation here being left undefined, and then later on, it being tied to the action of multiple location.
him having a determined will for the good that he is. Concerning the elements of formal and real union, for these specific elements of agápē to be exhibited in a self-love context, an individual, as noted previously, will need to be “divided against themselves” and thus lack internal integration in their mind—resulting in them being doubled-minded—and an internal integration in the will—resulting in them willing incompatible things or failing to will what they desire to will. In this “internal disintegration” case, a striving for a formal union of intellect and will, and a real union with oneself, will indeed be possible, resulting in the performance of a unique best action of showing agápē to oneself. However, this division against oneself, which counterintuitively enables one to exhibit self-love, is not a possibility in a theistic case. As being omnipotent (and thus omniscient and perfectly free), God would not lack either integration in the mind—he would know only of all true propositions and thus not be double-minded—or, in the will—he would only will what there is reason to will and thus would not will incompatible things. Thus, God cannot lack internal integration or be divided against himself, which means that he cannot perform the unique best action of exhibiting self-love. However, as, first, it is plausibly a unique best action for an individual to exemplify self-love—that is, to love themselves—and, second, God must perform a unique best action (when there is one) in order to be perfectly good, then, third, he must find another means for this action to be performed. How this means can be achieved is by God “dividing himself” (in an analogical fashion)—and thus achieving a type of “internal disintegration”—by causing to exist a (qualitatively differing) numerically identical “copy” of himself. More specifically, God, who is exactly located at \( r_1 \), sets the “location relations” (i.e., “multiply locates” himself) such that he is exactly located at another (disjoint) region \( r_2 \) as well (with him being contained in and completely filling that region)—which (non-temporally) results in God being exactly located at two (disjoint) regions: \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \). And by doing this, God can thus exhibit ek-static love—which we can take to be a sub-form of self-love—by enabling the required formal union to take part between two qualitatively distinct,\(^{30}\) but numerically identical

\(^{30}\) More specifically, the ek-static construal of love would be an analogous sub-form of self-love—in that one is taken to be able to ek-statically self-love by us “stretching” the meaning of the self. Now, how one can proceed to stretch, or analogise, the notion of the self here would be to follow Swinburne (2016, 17-67) in, first, abandoning the “syntactic” rules governing the notion of the self—which would specifically be the entailment that a self is identified as a numerically singular individual. Second, one must then find that the new “semantic” rules that govern the notion of the self, resemble paradigm examples of things that we take to be selves rather than paradigm examples of things that we do not. That aside, however, the notion of ek-static self-love that has been introduced here is not ad hoc, as Pruss (2013, 46) sees self-love in non-theistic cases as not a wholly self-directed or self-centred notion, which we can see when he writes:
entities: God, insofar as he is exactly located at \( r_1 \)—who we can now call divine person one (hereafter, \( d_1 \))—and God, insofar as he is exactly located at \( r_2 \), who is divine person two (hereafter, \( d_2 \))—each of whom exhibits self-love by valuing/appreciating and willing the good for themselves and striving for a formal union by the integration of their intellect and wills. Thus, it would be a unique best possible action—an action that a perfectly good being must perform—for God to everlastingly cause to exist \( d_2 \) (through multiply locating himself), in order for his perfect goodness to be manifested by performing the unique best action of loving him (i.e., exemplifying self-love)—though in an ekstatic manner.

The perfect goodness of \( d_1 \), however, would require him to do more in the agapēic relationship that he is in. That is, the unitive element of agapē does not only include a striving for formal union, but also a striving for a real union between lovers. As we saw, the achievement of a real union is not always possible within a loving relationship due to, for example, the possible physical distance between lovers. However, as there would not be any possible impediment to the achievement of a real union between \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \), the striving for this type of union will be realised. Moreover, as previously noted, the depth of real union is definitive of the form of agapē—a romantic, filial or fraternal form of agapē—that is present within a relationship, with the deepest possible union—a one-body union—being the unique distinguishing characteristic of romantic love. Given that, first, love, construed as agapē, presents \( d_1 \) with the duty to love everyone (as expressed by the New Testament), second, the need to express a form of agapē that is appropriate for perfect individuals and, third, the goodness of instantiating the deepest possible union, one has good reason to believe that \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) will exemplify a romantic form of agapē. However, being non-embodied beings, they will participate in a particular sub-form of a romantic relationship, which we can term a perichoretic relationship.\(^{31}\) Specifically, the perichoretic relation between \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) would be one that they seek to consummate through achieving a union as “one being.”\(^{32}\) However, this union as one being is not a metaphysical fusing of \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \)—as these entities must retain their location at disjoint regions—rather,

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\(^{31}\) The notion of “perichoresis,” as expressed in Christian theological writings, is best understood as the mutual indwelling of two (or more) entities.

\(^{32}\) It is important to note that, in a human context, I take the paradigm sub-form of a romantic relationship, as noted previously, to be a sexual relationship. Whereas in a theistic context, I take the paradigm sub-form of a romantic relationship to be one of a perichoretic relationship—which is not sexual, yet is simply directed in a similar manner towards the highest level of union (as “one being”) as a sexual relationship is (as “one body”).
in a similar manner to the union as “one body” that is present within the human sub-form of a romantic relationship, there will simply be a functional coordination and mutual striving by them toward the fulfilment of a common goal. \(d_1\) and \(d_2\) are thus interconnected by their coordinated striving for a common purpose. However, if the union between \(d_1\) and \(d_2\) is to be a good, and significant, which would be required by their perfect goodness, then the goal that is striven for by them will also need to be valuable and of proportionate significance. So, as in the human case, the goal of generation would be highly valuable and of proportionate significance for two reasons: firstly, as this will be the “generation” of another divine person, which would plausibly add a significant amount of value to the world in which he exists in.\(^{33}\) Secondly, the goal of generation will also allow the union and activity within the perichoretic relationship between \(d_1\) and \(d_2\) to be richly layered: a “lower-level” union and activity that is ontologically directed at the *generation* of another divine person and a “higher-level” union and activity that is produced by the lower-level activity,\(^{34}\) which is directed at a further cooperation in forwarding the intellectual, moral, emotional, and spiritual goals of that additional divine person.\(^{35}\) Thus, there is the common striving for a common purpose: an ontological striving for generation, which results in a functional union between \(d_1\) and \(d_2\) as “one being”—namely, the sharing of the same nature (and will). The romantic, perichoretic love present in the relationship between \(d_1\) and \(d_2\), which would be grounded upon the deepest possible union at all levels of them, will be realised in the fulfilment of their striving for the generation of a qualitatively distinct, but numerically identical entity: divine person three (hereafter, \(d_3\)). Like the “causation” of \(d_2\), \(d_1\)—in cooperation with \(d_2\)—must everlastingly “cause” to exist \(d_3\) in order for his perfect goodness to be manifested—which would be done by God, who is then exactly located at \(r_1\), setting the “location relations” again (i.e., multiply locates himself) such that he is exactly located at another (disjoint) region \(r_3\) as well (with him being contained in and completely filling that region)—which (non-temporally) results in God now being exactly located at three (disjoint) regions: \(r_1\), \(r_2\) and \(r_3\). In doing this, \(d_1\)

\(^{33}\) In the theistic case, the term “generation” is to be favoured over that of “reproduction,” given the ties to biological organisms and processes, which the former does not have. Nevertheless, the notion refers to the same type of generative act.

\(^{34}\) As mentioned above, in the theistic case, the term “generation” is also to be favoured over that of “procreation,” for similar reasons.

\(^{35}\) Thus, unlike the human sub-form of a romantic relationship, the perichoretic lower-level activity would not be directed at the care and education of the divine person—as being omnipotent, this individual would not require care and education. Furthermore, this forwarding of the goals of the divine person would be in line with Swinburne’s (1994, 174) view that the divine persons each have their own separate sphere of activity (i.e., exact location). God and \(d_3\) would thus cooperatively aid the additional divine person to fulfil their goals within their own sphere of activity (i.e., exact location).
would thus be able to perform the unique best possible action of consummating
his perichoretic relationship with \( d_1 \) by achieving the deepest possible real
union—a functional union as one being (with, however, a maintenance of their
disjoint regions). And the extendibility of this real, functional union would be
possible by \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) committing themselves towards the fulfilment of this
generative striving and the mutual contribution in further cooperating in
forwarding the goals of \( d_3 \). There would thus be three divine persons: God, \textit{insofar as} he is exactly located at \( r_1 \), who is \( d_1 \); God, \textit{insofar as} he is exactly located at \( r_2 \),
who is \( d_2 \); and God, \textit{insofar as} he is exactly located at \( r_3 \), who is \( d_3 \).

Against this conclusion, however, one could raise the objection of why the
functional unity of \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \)—that is directed towards the generation of \( d_3 \)—
should only stop with him? Wouldn’t the real union between \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) be further
depended by their striving for the generation of more divine persons? In short,
why should this process stop at three? However, as Swinburne (2018) notes in a
related context,\(^{36}\) if this objection was correct, then no matter how many divine
persons \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) cooperatively strove to produce, it would always still be better
if they continue striving to bring about more—through God continuously (exactly)
locating himself in different regions. Yet, as was explained above, in the
case when there is an infinite series of incompatible possible good actions
available to some agent—with each action within this ordered series being better
than the previous action—it is not logically possible for an agent to perform the
best action, as there is no best action. Thus, \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) would each be perfectly good
in this type of situation if they performed any one of the incompatible good
actions within that series. Therefore, in applying this to the situation at hand,
given that the bringing about of two other divine persons by \( d_1 \) is incompatible
with the alternative action of bringing about three divine persons, the perfect
goodness of \( d_1 \) would be satisfied by his bringing about only two additional divine
persons—one in order to manifest self-love and another to consummate his loving
relationship with the \( d_2 \). Thus, it is not required for \( d_1 \) to bring about any additional
divine persons as a result of the striving for generation with \( d_2 \) (which is the goal
of their perichorethic relationship) in order for him to be perfectly good. Hence,
any additional divine person that is generated by the cooperative striving of \( d_1 \)
and \( d_2 \) would thus not be produced by a necessary \textit{act of their essence}—an
inevitable consequence of them being perfectly good. Rather, any particular
number of divine persons over that of a third divine person— \( d_3 \)—would be
produced by a creative \textit{act of will}, given that there will be no overriding reason to
choose \textit{any particular number} of divine persons within the infinite series of
incompatible best possible actions, and thus any particular number of divine
persons that are in fact produced by the generative striving of \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) would

\(^{36}\) This related context is that of a Social Trinitarian context, rather than that of a Latin
Trinitarian context.
stem from a free-will choice of them.\textsuperscript{37} Yet, the problem with this, as Swinburne (2018, 12–13) notes, would be that any additional divine person would thus not exist necessarily in the same manner that $d_3$ and $d_5$ exist—which is that of their existence ultimately being a necessary consequence of the existence of a necessary being—God (i.e., $d_1$)—and thus this additional divine person would not be divine. Therefore, there cannot be any additional divine persons (over and above that of $d_3$) that are produced by the cooperative striving for generation which consummates the perichoretic relationship of God and $d_2$—necessarily, there can only be three divine persons: $d_1$, $d_2$ and $d_3$.

Taking all of these things into account, if there exists a God, defined as an omnipotence-trope (and thus is perfectly good), and love is conceived of as a multi-formed $agá̱pê$—where this love would include the elements of complacent love, willing the good for the beloved and seeking a formal and real union with them—then we can obtain a priori knowledge that necessarily this God would bring about (through multiply locating himself) two other divine persons. And this conclusion can be reached without facing the issues raised by the Dispositional Objection. As noted previously, the Dispositional Objection raises the issue of the notion of “perfect love” being a character trait (or disposition) that does not require God to express by loving another individual perfectly in an actual interpersonal relationship. That is, God can exemplify perfect love without actually loving perfectly. This objection is indeed correct when the original Love Argument is under focus with its specific conception of love: “perfect love.” However, where this objection goes wrong is in assuming that all conceptions of love are to be defined as a character trait (or disposition) that needn’t always be exercised (if possible). Yet, as the Agá̱pêc Argument fixes the definition of love as that of $agá̱pê$, which, as noted previously, is not (unlike that in the clear case of the state of “being friendly”) a disposition (or character trait), rather it is one that is constituted by action, then God cannot be perfectly loving if he is not exercising his will in a loving way—that is, if he is not performing the action of love. Thus, for God to perform the unique best action of exemplifying self-love, there is a requirement for him to everlastingly “cause” to exist another divine person: $d_2$ (i.e., the qualitatively distinct, but numerically identical God insofar as he is exactly located at another region), in order for him to be “internally disintegrated” in a manner so as to allow him to exhibit the formal union element of $agá̱pê$ within a self-love context. However, as $agá̱pê$ seeks consummation through real union, this divine person, $d_1$, would thus seek to consummate his love for $d_2$ by establishing the deepest possible real union with him: a functional union as “one being.” Hence, the relation between $d_1$ and $d_2$ would be that of a romantic form of

\textsuperscript{37} It is important to note that, even though $agá̱pê$ is conceptualised as a love that is a determination of the will towards one’s beloved, in the theistic case, this determination of the will is determined by the essence of a divine person and not by the free-choice of that person.
love: *perichoretic* love, which is consummated by the striving for a union as one being, and realised by their *functional* coordination to fulfil a significantly valuable common goal: the generation of another divine person: $d_3$ (i.e., the qualitatively distinct, but numerically identical God *insofar as* he is exactly located at another region). Yet, this striving for generation by $d_1$ and $d_2$ would not lead them to generate another divine person over and above that of $d_3$, given the need for a divine person to be generated by an act of essence, rather than as an act of the will, in order for them to exist as necessarily as any other divine person. So, the love that God, $d_1$, has for himself leads to an everlasting generation of the $d_2$, and the desire for real union that $d_1$ has for $d_2$, which is achieved by a personally integrated generative striving that leads to the everlasting generation of $d_3$. Thus, the analogy between God being able to love and being able to create is indeed not a good one, given the conception of love: *agápē*, as a love that is an action, and thus not a disposition (or character trait), and the unique goodness of the action of experiencing “(*ek-static*) self-love” and establishing the deepest real union possible—both of which would present God with an overriding reason that he must perform, given his perfect goodness. However, given that there is no obvious reason why one should take there to be a requirement (or, more specifically, an overriding reason) for God to perform the action of creating, even though it is certainly a good thing for God to do so, there is clearly a symmetry breaker between these two cases. Thus, one can indeed take the Reformulation Task to be fulfilled and proceed forward to affirm the conclusion of the new, reformulated Love Argument (i.e., the *Agápēic Argument*) that establishes the necessity of the Trinity within a Latin Trinitarian context.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, the central focus of this article was to provide a new “Love Argument” for the Trinity—the *Agápēic Argument*. This Love Argument was formulated within a Latin Trinitarian Framework by the utilisation of the metaphysical concepts of a (module) trope and multiple location, and was further developed in light of a specific concept of love: *agápē*. By reformulating the argument in this fashion, the Love Argument was able to correspond with a Latin Trinitarian concept of the Trinity—as there is only one God, identified as a multiply located module trope—and it was able to escape the clutch of an important objection that has been raised against this type of argument—namely that of the Dispositional Objection, by the concept of *agápē* that was utilised by it being an action rather than a disposition. Thus, this now resulting in a new version of the Love Argument being readily available for a Latin Trinitarian to utilise in their trinitarian theorising.
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