

Threefold Hidden God

MIŁOSZ HOŁDA

The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow

miłosz.henryk@interia.pl

Abstract: In the context of current discussions on the problem of divine hiddenness in the field of analytic philosophy and beyond, I propose the concept of “threefold Hidden God.” In our times divine hiddenness becomes, so to speak, a divine attribute replacing other characteristics traditionally ascribed to God. Hiddenness, however, is not only an attribute of God understood from the so-called *de deo uno* perspective. It is possible to think about this attribute also in the Trinitarian context. According to my proposal God can be understood as hidden in three ways: in the laws of nature, in history, and in relationships with humans. This concept of “threefold hidden God” is a reference to the old proposal, originating from Augustine, to seek the traces of the Triune God who is present in man. The search for “threefold hidden God” seems to be more appropriate for our times and seems to be a promising proposal for an even deeper Trinitarian renewal of the analytic tradition.

Keywords: Hiddenness of God, Trinity, Perichoresis, *Hester panim*, *Deus absconditus*

One of the most interesting and important discussions taking place in the area of analytical philosophy is the discussion about divine hiddenness.¹ The latest version of this discussion, which has a long philosophical-theological tradition, was initiated by the so-called “argument from hiddenness” of J. L. Schellenberg (see Schellenberg 1993; Schellenberg 2015)

The discussion initiated by Schellenberg, however, is only one of the areas of the contemporary dispute over divine hiddenness. There are two more also important areas in which this discussion is taking place: the first is the Jewish reflection on *hester panim*—God’s hiding face during the Holocaust, the second—philosophy and theology of science, in which the old idea of *Deus absconditus* returns. I believe that it is only when all these areas are taken into account that we can understand what is at stake. Only then can we see how complicated the

¹ The present paper was written thanks to the support granted by Narodowe Centrum Nauki (National Science Centre), Poland (the research project no. 2018/29/B/HS1/00922).

problem of divine hiddenness is, but we also have a chance to try to deal with it.

Usually, the problem of divine hiddenness is addressed from a *de deo uno* perspective. The solution that I am going to propose is to address this problem from a *de deo trino* perspective. I intend to follow St. Augustine (2002, 57–59), who sought the footsteps of the Triune God in man, pointing to memory, understanding and will as the signs of God's presence in man and the evidence that man was created in God's image. However, I will not look for traces of the triune God in the powers of the human person. I will propose a path leading through three areas of contemporary discussion about God's hiddenness. I will briefly look at all the three areas. Then, I will show the relationship between them. Finally, I will propose a sketch of a new approach to the problem of divine hiddenness—a Trinitarian approach—which can be encapsulated in the slogan: threefold hidden God. I will also show what relevance the reflection on the idea of the threefold hidden God can have for the analytical tradition.

Let us begin with Schellenberg and his “the hiddenness argument.” While there is no need to discuss this argument at length here, it might be worthwhile recalling Schellenberg's belief that God should be expected to be more open, more obvious. In his opinion, there is no good reason why God should hide. Underlying Schellenberg's argument is the assumption that if God existed, He would make it possible for all who are ready to relate to Him to have convincing testimonies for His existence. These testimonies are the basis for the belief that God exists. Having this conviction is considered necessary in order to establish a relationship with God.

Schellenberg's opponents indicate the reasons why God could remain hidden (see Dumsday 2014; Moser 2002). They also point out that it is difficult to think of such testimonies of His presence that are conclusive and convincing for all (see Van Inwagen 2008, 148–151). The whole discussion can be treated as a dispute over the problem of God's hiding in relations with people, in communication with them. In this context, the God defended by theists is a “God hidden in communication.”

The consequence of divine hiddenness in this dimension is not only rational non-belief, but also religious diversity (see McKim 2001). People's awareness of the significant differences between followers of different religions in our time, and a different view of atheism, which is no longer regarded as a symptom of intellectual or moral weakness, put the defenders of theism in a new, very difficult cognitive situation. “God hidden in communication” is not an obvious God. Rather, He is a God who does not communicate in the same way with all, and thus does not adapt to the epistemic requirements that we set for Him. The challenge for the defenders of theism is to find an answer to the question of why God remains hidden. For Schellenberg, “hiddenness” is the reason for re-

jecting the classical theistic thesis or at least weakening it. Advocates of classical theism, especially the Christian version, are inclined to defend the thesis that “hiddenness” is not a reason to reject the thesis of God's existence or even to weaken the theses concerning God's attributes.

Let us look at the second area of the discussion about divine hiddenness. This stream of discussion devoted to the problem of *hester panim*—God's hidden face began anew after the Second World War in the field of Jewish philosophy and theology. The problem of *hester panim*, however, is not a new one. It was present in the Old Testament, where several reasons for God hiding His face were mentioned (see Balentine 1984; Gericke 2015), the most important of these being human sin. God hides His face in order to punish people who break God's law. There is, however, at least one text in the Old Testament (Psalm 44) where a complaint about God's hidden face is connected with the awareness of innocence, and the conviction that God has nothing to punish. Then *hester panim* appears as God's totally inexplicable behaviour (see Sanders 2013).

Many Jewish theologians referred to the biblical thread of *hester panim* in order to deal with the experience of God's inexplicable silence in the face of the Holocaust. The moot point was whether the Holocaust was an exceptional event incomparable with any other, or whether it was one of the many difficult experiences of the Jewish people (see Fackenheim 1970; Dorff and Newman 1999; Breiterman 1998; Wolpe 1997; Peli 2007). Regardless of which position is right, the problem of God's failure to intervene during the Holocaust boils down to the problem of “divine hiddenness in history.” “God hidden in history” is a God who sometimes does not intervene when we expect Him to, nor in the way we think He should.

However, “divine hiddenness in history” can also have a more individual character. This is the question of God's lack of action in the face of the evil experienced by an individual person. I believe that the version of the problem of “divine hiddenness in history” which does not refer to the community but to individuals works most closely together with the “evidential argument from evil.”² Not only is this version not weaker or less significant than the version concerning the whole nation, but, on the contrary, it becomes even more problematic and painful.

The strength of the combination of these two threads: the dramatic historical experiences that are still present in our collective memory and in our individual lives, and the awareness of the great religious diversity and spread of atheism undoubtedly pose a great challenge for theists.

On top of these two threads there was a third one, which had already been present in Western thought for some time. It was connected with the rapid de-

² On the evidential argument from evil see: Howard-Snyder (1996).

velopment of natural sciences. The philosophical and theological reflection which took place on the margins of this development led to the formulation of the concept of a causally closed, self-sufficient physical universe, which is explained by means of factors remaining within this world. The principle of methodological naturalism, which is the epistemological basis of science, very unambiguously excludes all non-physical factors to which we would like to refer in the explanatory processes. The fear of the danger of *God of gaps*-style explanations has created a situation in which a place for God is sought only in the area of phenomena taking place outside of the so-called macro-scale (for example below the Planck scale), or by constructing such models in which God is treated only as the first cause of the world's existence and, at most, the force supporting the world in existence. In this context, God is shown as "hidden in the laws of nature" that govern the world.

The idea of *Deus absconditus*, to which various authors refer, entails the conviction that it is impossible to empirically confirm God's action in the world. God is understood not as an active subject who is able to act in the physical world, but only as a hidden source of existence and dynamics of the world acting independently, at most by virtue of the laws given to it by God (see Ferguson 2004). According to the proponents of such a view of God's action, the existence of God, who is the creator of the laws of nature, but does not interfere with events taking place in the world, is easier to reconcile with evil present in history, and the diversity of beliefs and religious attitudes (see Crysdale and Ormerod 2013). "God hidden in the laws of nature" is such a God who does not act in the world directly and who does not break the laws of nature. It is worth noting, however, that there are also interpretations of the problem of God's hiddenness considered in the context of science, according to which it is not necessary to deprive God of the possibility of intervening in the world (see Hořda and Lambert 2021). Such propositions seem to express much better the Christian belief in God's omnipotence and providence.

Therefore, in contemporary thought, we have three essential, intermingling ways of thinking about divine hiddenness: "hiddenness in communication," "hiddenness in history" and "hiddenness in the laws of nature." Most interestingly, however, the discussion about divine hiddenness follows these three tracks. I don't think that this is a matter of chance. This coincidence should rather be interpreted as an expression of a very significant phenomenon.

All these dimensions of hiddenness can, of course, be considered from the *de deo uno* perspective that is characteristic of natural theology. But this perspective makes it possible to deal with the problem of hiddenness in a limited way. The arguments formulated from this perspective are essentially defensive in relation to the accusations made by opponents of theism. The references made by theists to the idea of the "hidden God" could be treated by opponents of the-

ism as desperate attempts to save whatever can be saved in the heritage of the Jewish or Christian theism. The opponent of theism might argue in the following way: if it is impossible to demonstrate an active presence of God in the world, if God does not intervene in those moments of history in which his interventions would be most desirable, if there are those who could believe, but do not believe, then there is nothing left for theists to do but talk about a “hidden God.” Such an idea, however, is only one away from theists’ complete surrender, for the “hidden God” is one who is actually absent, ineffective and defenceless. The next and inevitable stage of the process of God’s withdrawal from the world seems to be the idea of *Deus otiosus*—a superfluous God, who is only a vague memory of old, immature ways of thinking about man and the world.

Experts in the history of religion suggest that the natural course of things is as follows: God actively present in the world gradually becomes a “hidden God” and then a superfluous God—*Deus otiosus* (see Eliade 1987, 125; Olson 1992, 52–54; Wasserstrom 1999, 226–227). I believe that solving the problem of divine hiddenness from a *de deo uno* perspective can lead to such a consequence, which is why it is not only unsatisfactory, but also religiously and culturally dangerous. The defence of the “hidden God” should not be seen as a strategy of desperate rescue of the remnants of Judaism or Christianity, the remnants of religion, but rather as a step towards a deeper understanding of who God is.

This is related to another problem, namely, treating “divine hiddenness” as “necessary evil” in theology, as a problem that must somehow be dealt with. In theology of the twentieth century, there were voices that the problem of “divine hiddenness” is much more important and complex than the majority of theologians tended to think. Karl Rahner was the best recognizable supporter of the serious treatment of “divine hiddenness.” His intention was to draw theologians’ attention to the fact that the problem of God’s mystery and incomprehensibility (which for Rahner meant hiddenness) is not a marginal problem of Christianity, but a central issue. In his view, theologians too often looked at divine hiddenness as just one of many divine attributes, and treated this attribute as not a very significant one. According to Rahner (1975), however, divine hiddenness should be the starting point of theology, always and everywhere emphasizing the unique “character” of God.

According to Rahner divine hiddenness is not only an epistemological problem, but also, and perhaps above all, a metaphysical one. On the one hand, it is true that human beings are unable to understand God accurately; this is because God transcends human rationality. On the other hand, one should not forget that God as an infinite being is mysterious in Himself. Bringing the whole problem down to the epistemological question only is therefore not only insufficient, but it completely prevents proper formulation of this issue. Rahner

emphasises that no human effort can rid man of the veil that separates him from God. The only one who can remove that veil and allow man to know what, despite his best efforts, would always remain unknowable to him, is God, who freely reveals himself to man.

Treating the problem of “divine hiddenness” ‘positively’ reveals to man not only the area of new existential experiences or clarifies the experiences already possessed, but also opens up new cognitive perspectives. In Rahner's opinion, we should not only recall those elements of tradition in which the problem of hiddenness is treated with due seriousness, but also free ourselves from the pressure of the Enlightenment concept of knowledge, according to which mysteriousness, or hiddenness, decreases with better knowledge of the object. Rahner (1961) brings up a healthy tradition of apophatic theology, thanks to which we are able to deal with the Mystery better, not trying to subordinate it to our standards of knowledge, but modifying these standards in the light of the Mystery. Reflecting on God's incomprehensibility changes the way in which divine revelation is understood. In this light, it is not the unveiling of something previously hidden, the acquisition of a gnosis that allows one to look beneath the surface of reality. It is rather a radical manifestation of the permanent mystery. If we forget that *deus revelatus* also appears as *deus absconditus*, we succumb to the temptation of idolatry (see Mariani 2014, 180–181). The history of God's revelation is for Rahner the history of an ever deepening perception of God as mystery. This perception, Rahner (1961, 305) clearly emphasises, does not end with death. God remains incomprehensible also in the glory of heaven.

Reflecting on God's incomprehensibility, thinking of God as “hidden,” not only influences Eschatology, but is also important in other areas of theology. It is especially important in Christology. It is in Christ that God's incomprehensibility is most fully seen and in Him that it can be most fully experienced. In this light, the Christian is someone who entrusts himself to God's mystery, which has allowed itself to be seen and has entered the human world. The incarnation, however, is not the removal of God's hiddenness, but the way in which it gives itself to man. Man submits to the incomprehensibility of God by entering into the unconditional love of Jesus for humanity and his absolute surrender to God's incomprehensibility, which culminates in his death. After all, Jesus also walks the path of God's incomprehensibility. He too knows the Father as “the hidden God.” In this light, Jesus' death was both an experience of self-emptying and abandonment by the Father, and a radical acceptance and loving obedience to the Father in the midst of this self-emptying and powerlessness (see Phan 2005, 182).

Rahner drew attention to an extremely important problem—namely, the central place of divine hiddenness in Christian thought. Let us try to go one step further and deepen his speculation. At the same time, let us treat hiddenness as

an attribute that is not considered from the perspective of *de deo uno*, but *de deo trino*.

Given the fact that the contemporary discussion on God's hiddenness takes place in three areas, it is necessary to look for the possibility of combining them and showing a common ground of reference for all three areas. The problem of hiddenness contains three problems: "hiddenness in the laws of nature," "hiddenness in history" and "hiddenness in communication." It may be suggested, then, that the three problems of hiddenness signal one fundamental problem of hiddenness (or are inseparable aspects of it), which can be expressed in the words: why is God not more obvious? In order to show the connection of these problems in a single problem of hiddenness, it is necessary to look for the possibility of reconciling the triplicity with the unity and, while preserving the necessary separateness of the three problems indicated, to ground them in what constitutes the principle of their unity. If this task were successful, then it would be possible to justify the thesis that treating the problems of hiddenness as separate not only makes it difficult but even impossible to deal with any version of the problem of hiddenness.

These problems relate to each other, each of them evoking the other two. Whichever of the problems of hiddenness is put in the foreground, the other two will follow. Whoever tries to deal with the problem of hiddenness in nature must be aware that it has consequences in terms of the question of the possibility of God's action in history and the provision of testimonies to His existence for people. Whoever asks about the hiddenness of God in the tragic events of history must consider how God can act in the world at all and what this implies for individuals who wish to be in relationship with him. Whoever asks about hiddenness in relationships cannot fail to ask where in the world there is room for God's action and how the existence of God should become manifest in the tragic events of history.

This linking of the problems of hiddenness at the theoretical level is a sign of the linking of the different experiences of hiddenness at the existential level. Whoever stops seeing God in one dimension, finds it much more difficult to see Him in other dimensions. Whoever begins to see Him in one dimension, finds it easier to see Him in others. God always hides Himself in three ways and reveals himself in three ways. The conclusion to be drawn from this is as such: if we wish to agree to God's hiding, we must agree to a threefold hiding. The experiences of hiddenness, though embedded in different dimensions, remain closely related to one another. The three problems of hiding, although they can be considered separately, at a deeper level constitute a unity. Therefore, the solution to the problems to be sought must be one. The principle of linking these problems, in turn, must be such as to make possible the unity in the triplicity.

The God whose existence must therefore be postulated in order to open the way to dealing with the one, albeit threefold, problem of hiddenness is the “threefold hidden God.” His essence contains the metaphysical basis of the triplicity of the problem of hiddenness, and at the same time the principle of its deepest unity. This account of God’s essence is a consequence of the cognitive perspective in which the question of God’s hiddenness is posed. Seen from the perspective of the threefold problem of hiddenness, God must appear as “threefold hidden.”

Taking into account the triplicity of God’s hiddenness allows us to realize that nature, history, and relations with human beings are, for God, intimately connected and interpenetrating ways of His manifestation, even if an essential part of this divine manifestation is His hiddenness. It is therefore impossible to come any closer to understanding who God is, and consequently to dealing with the problem of hiddenness, not only without considering all these modes of interconnected and hidden manifestation together, but also without assuming that they are intimately connected. Considering the problem of hiddenness from only one perspective does not allow us to deal with it or even fully express it. Schellenberg’s approach, even though he incidentally mentions other issues at stake, concentrates on what can be called “hiddenness in communication.” Taking into account the other problem areas on the one hand complicates the matter, but on the other hand allows for showing the problem of hiddenness in all its varieties.

Christian intuitions derived from the Revelation, because God is revealed while remains hidden to some extent, so these intuitions tell us that God is present not only in the act of creation, but is also present in history in the deepest possible way. He also continues to maintain relationships with people, communicating with them through what Christian theology calls grace. Only Trinitarian theology—theology that starts from *de deo trino* perspective—takes into account all these intuitions with sufficient clarity. All these intuitions are equally important, and it is not a good idea to give up any, even to defend God from accusations of evil or hiddenness. And this is how the attempts to speak about the hidden God from a *de deo uno* perspective usually end.

But Christianity teaches us also that the Divine Persons remain in the deepest union. This interpenetrating union is referred to as “perichoresis.”³ The way in which it happens is the most mysterious thing to think about. It is something hidden *par excellence*. We must therefore find such a theology of hiddenness that preserves all these intuitions, a theology that includes the three dimensions of hiddenness without diminishing any of them, and that is also capable of telling us something about divine unity. Let me present a sketch of such a theology.

³ On this notion see for example: Stamatović (2016).

Without denying the deepest unity of God, we can distinguish three “dimensions” of hiddenness: paternal, filial and pneumatological. The first would be related to creation, which can be interpreted not only as the calling of the world out of nothingness to exist, but also as giving the world the laws that govern it. The second dimension would be related to the incarnation, which is a historical fact and sheds light on history, which, although subject to the laws that govern the world, is nevertheless the arena of free choices of individuals and unique acts that cannot be strictly subordinated to the physical laws that govern them. The third dimension, in Christian concepts described as the life of grace, would be connected with communication between persons. The creation, the incarnation and the life of grace, while all are “dimensions” of single process God’s self-giving to man and to the world, can be conceptually separated and attributed to the individual persons of the Trinity.

All these “dimensions” of hiddenness are intertwined; however, the way of this intertwining is cognitively inaccessible for us. All the “dimensions” of hiddenness have a common source, and they are expressions of the same Mystery that reveals itself to us in different ways. On the one hand, we are faced with the determining power of the laws that govern the world. On the other hand, if they acted in an absolutely decisive way, they would not give space either for the freedom present in history or for communication between individuals. History is based both on the laws governing the world, and on acts of interpersonal communication. And communication is possible only on the basis of laws and in history. Since the three dimensions of divine hiddenness are closely linked, it is easier to understand why the hiddenness of God in one dimension is linked to hiddenness in others, and why “seeing” God in one dimension opens the way to “seeing” Him in others.

The texts we find in the books of the New Testament point to the fact that seeing (knowing) the individual Persons of the Trinity is dependent on seeing (knowing) the other Persons. From this we can deduce that the hiddenness of the individual Persons entails the hiddenness of the other Persons of the Trinity. Let us highlight some examples. Jesus says: “He who has seen me has seen the Father” (John 14, 9). This does not mean “seeing” only the “human form” of Jesus, but “seeing” His divinity—His being the Son sent by the Father. These words indicate that without knowing the divinity of Jesus it is impossible to know the God-Father. The Father is hidden from those who do not know the divinity of the Son. Jesus’ promise: “But the Helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said to you” (John 14:26), points to the work of the Spirit, who reveals Jesus’ identity as sent by the Father. Without the communication made possible by the Spirit, both the identity of Jesus and the sending by the Father (and consequently the Father Himself) will remain hidden. Finally, the

words about the Spirit who “searches all things, even the depths of God” (1 Cor 2:10) can be read as suggesting that it is the Spirit who gives us access to the knowledge of the Father.

This interrelation between the ways of being hidden by the Divine Persons and the possibility for us to see (know) the Divine Persons at the “economic” level (in the sense of the Economy of Salvation) is not simply the result of our cognitive limitations, but an expression of the way in which God wants to make Himself known and unveiled to us. The mystery of God is a threefold mystery and therefore the hiddenness of God challenges us in the three dimensions mentioned above. However, they are so closely interrelated that they must be considered as rooted in a single metaphysical basis. Only the Trinitarian intuitions contained in Christian theology are able to open the way for us to properly grasp the threefold problem of hiddenness with which we have to contend today. The discussion that is currently taking place around the problem of hiddenness allows us to see in a new light the traditional Christian theses on God's way of revealing Himself. Drawing on Trinitarian intuitions, we are able to find an answer to the question why hiddenness takes place precisely in three and, moreover, precisely in such and not other dimensions.

Awareness of all these dimensions is necessary in order to avoid absolutisation of any of them and various types of reductionism. Thanks to theology of the threefold hidden God we also realise that insufficient knowledge of particular aspects of the world causes a lack of understanding of other aspects of the world as well. Without understanding the laws that govern the world, we are also unable to understand history and communication. Failure to take into account the laws of the world and the acts of communication does not allow us to properly understand what is historical. Forgetting about the laws and our embedment in history closes the way to proper communication.

Theology of the threefold hidden God is therefore the best protection of our cognition. It builds such a “top-down” scheme of relations between particular areas of cognition, which allows us to limit the power of reductionisms. It reminds us that it is impossible to reduce the truth about the world and man to the dimension of the laws governing the world, to history or to communication. All these areas of research must develop harmoniously. This concept, which, however, also includes the idea of *perichoresis*, leads us to assume that all these dimensions are united. The idea of such a combination must remain the epistemic ideal and a critical instance of our cognitive efforts. Although the theology of the threefold hidden God is a result of theological speculation based on our experiences, it has a chance to influence our cognition and science, showing us the epistemic ideal to which our efforts should be directed. Thus, it is possible for the analytic tradition to not only use scientific understanding of the reali-

ty, or adopt a scientific notion of rationality, but also to influence science by constructing epistemic ideals directing scientific inquiries.

Above all, the analytic tradition must find a way of not separating these three dimensions of hiddenness. While the reflection on “God hidden in the laws of nature” is quite advanced and the reflection on “God hidden in communication” is still developing, the reflection on “God hidden in history” must find its proper place. What is more, it happens that using the *de deo uno* perspective, the analytic tradition promotes specific aspects and absolutizes them, leading to an aspectal reductionism. Balancing all these three perspectives is a very difficult matter, and it is only possible if one has in front of one’s eyes the Trinitarian matrix contained in the slogan: threefold hidden God. The memory of the unity of these three dimensions can also be a reason to bring together the analytic tradition and other traditions that are more sensitive to the dimension of historicity. This would be to the benefit of all. Although it may seem very difficult or even impossible to do, only an ambitious, Trinitarian-modelled program of philosophical activity can contribute to such a meeting.

Like any theology that has cognitive ambitions, the theology of the threefold hidden God I have just proposed, is meant to answer the questions: where is God? Where can you meet Him? How can we discover Him? The threefold discussion about divine hiddenness that we are witnessing in contemporary thought can be treated as *signum temporis*. It is no coincidence that these three dimensions are being explored today in search of the “hidden God.” What Christian theology has to say about this threefold search boils down to the simple question: is it not the case that “God hidden in the laws of nature,” “God hidden in history” and “God hidden in communication” is one God—the Triune God? However, while Augustine saw traces of the Triune God in the three powers belonging to the human person, we see His traces in the three dimensions of hiddenness that are being discussed today. Perhaps for many of our contemporaries God is no longer visible as He was for Augustine. This does not mean, however, that they cannot be guided to the traces of the Triune God by their struggle with God’s threefold hiddenness. It is also worthwhile for the analytic tradition to take this question into account and try to answer it with the tools at its disposal. The task facing this tradition, which I think is capable of trying to think about divine hiddenness in these three dimensions—dimensions connected by a mysterious act of *perichoresis*—is also to guard the “hidden God.” The point is that we manage to understand that the word about the “hidden God,” the threefold hidden God, is not a desperate attempt to prevent Him from becoming a *Deus otiosus*—an unnecessary or superfluous God. Rather, it is about showing that the word about threefold hidden God, is what Christianity has always had and still has to say.

Bibliography

- St. Augustine. 2002. *On the Trinity*. Edited by Gareth Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Balentine, Samuel. 1984. *The Hidden God. The Hiding of the Face of God in the Old Testament*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Breiterman, Zachary 1998. *(God) After Auschwitz. Tradition and Challenge in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822768>.
- Crysdale Cynthia and Neil Ormerod. 2013. *Creator God, Evolving World*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22nm8kz>.
- Dorff, Elliot and Louis Newman (eds.) (1999). *Contemporary Jewish Theology. A Reader*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dumsday, Travis. 2014. "Divine Hiddenness as Deserved." *Faith and Philosophy* 31: 286–302. <https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20149217>.
- Eliade, Mircea. 1987. *The Sacred and the Profane. The Nature of Religion*. New York: Aharvest Book.
- Fackenheim, Emil. 1970. *God's Presence in History. Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical Reflections*. New York, London: New York University Press, University of London Press.
- Fergusson, Kitty. 2004. *The Fire in the Equations. Science, Religion, and the Search for God*. Philadelphia, London: Templeton Foundation Press.
- Gericke, Jaco. 2015. "A comparative-philosophical perspective on divine hiddenness in the Hebrew Bible." *Verbum et Ecclesia* 36, <https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v36i1.1400>.
- Hołda, Miłosz and Dominique Lambert. 2021. "The Problem of Divine Hiddenness in the Context of Science." *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 69 (3): 43–60. <https://doi.org/10.18290/rf21693-3>.
- Howard-Snyder, Daniel (ed.). 1996. *The Evidential Argument from Evil*. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Mariani, Milena. 2014. "La specificità cristiana del concetto di Dio secondo Karl Rahner. Una risposta scontata?". *Annali di Studi Religiosi* 15: 171–190.
- McKim, Robert. 2001. *Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0195128354.001.0001>.
- Moser, Paul. 2002. "Cognitive Idolatry and Divine Hiding." In *Divine Hiddenness. New essays*. Eds. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser, 120–148. New York: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606090.007>.
- Olson, Carl. 1992. *The Theology and Philosophy of Eliade. The Search for the Center*. London: Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378926>.

- Peli, Pinchas. 2007. "Borderline: Searching for a Religious Language of the Shoah." In *Wrestling with God. Jewish Theological Responses during and after the Holocaust*. Ed. Steven Katz, 245–262. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Phan, Peter. 2005. "Eschatology". In *The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner*. Eds. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines, 174–193. New York: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521832888.012>.
- Polkinghorne, John. 2012. "Some Theological Reflections." In: *Georges Lemaître. Life, Science and Legacy*. Eds. Rodney Holdera and Simon Mitton, 193–196. Heidelberg: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32254-9_14.
- Rahner, Karl. 1961. "Über den Begriff des Geheimnisses in der katholischen Theologie." In *Schriften zur Theologie IV*, Karl Rahner, 51–99. Einsiedeln: Benziger.
- Rahner, Karl. 1975. "Über die Verborgenheit Gottes". In *Schriften zur Theologie XII*, Karl Rahner, 285–305. Einsiedeln: Benziger.
- Sanders, Paul. 2013. "How comprehensible can divine silence be? Reflections on the biblical evidence." In *Reflections on the Silence of God. A Discussion with Marjo Korpel and Johannes de Moor*. Ed. Bob Becking, 127–138. Leiden, Boston: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004259133_008.
- Schellenberg, John L. 1993. *Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Schellenberg, John L. 2015. *The Hiddenness Argument. Philosophy's New Challenge to Belief in God*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198733089.001.0001>.
- Stamatović, Slobodan. 2016. "The Meaning of Perichoresis." *Open Theology* 2: 303–323. <https://doi.org/10.1515/opth-2016-0026>.
- Van Inwagen, Peter. 2008. *The Problem of Evil*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195331356.003.0009>.
- Wasserstrom, Steven. 1999. *Religion after Religion. Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400823178>.
- Wolpe, David. 1997. "Hester Panim in Modern Jewish Thought." *Modern Judaism* 17: 25–56. <https://doi.org/10.1093/mj/17.1.25>.

Published Online: June 10, 2022