Ampère et Duhem : classification naturelle et engagements ontologiques

Authors

  • Charles Braverman Archives H. Poincaré, Université de Lorraine

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.20416/lsrsps.v3i1.173

Keywords:

Ampère, Duhem, théorie physique, métaphysique, engagement ontologique, expliquer, représenter, classification naturelle, phénoménalisme, réalisme, conventionnalisme, probabilité, religion, providentialisme

Abstract

Duhem is known for his criticism of induction and especially of the way Ampère pretends founding electrodynamics. Despite this criticism, they share philosophical commitments: an attempt to destroy essentialism, a renewal of the link between metaphysics and physics, the use of the concept of “natural classification”. Thanks to this concept of “natural classification”, they are both led to a similar structural realism. In their opinion, if metaphysics should not determine physics, there is still room for it. Actually, the hope of a progress toward a natural classification expressing truth may imply – in Duhem’s and Ampère’s works – a kind of providentialism.

Author Biography

  • Charles Braverman, Archives H. Poincaré, Université de Lorraine
    • Doctorant aux Archives H. Poincaré de Nancy.
    • Professeur agrégé de philosophie au lycée H. Parriat de Montceau les Mines.
    • Chargé de cours à l'Université de Bourgogne.

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Published

2016-12-22

Issue

Vol. 3 No. 1 (2016): Proceedings of the 2014 SPS congress

Section

Proceedings of the 2014 congress (metaphysics of science)

License

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.

How to Cite

“Ampère et Duhem : Classification Naturelle et Engagements Ontologiques”. 2016. Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie Des Sciences 3 (1). https://doi.org/10.20416/lsrsps.v3i1.173.