@article{Ginammi_2016, title={The Applicability of Mathematics and the Indispensability Arguments}, volume={3}, url={https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/latosensu/article/view/3193}, DOI={10.20416/lsrsps.v3i1.313}, abstractNote={<p>In this paper I will take into examination the relevance of the main indispensability arguments (Quine’s and Colyvan’s, Putnam’s, and explanatory indispensability argument) for the comprehension of the applicability of mathematics. I will conclude not only that none of these indispensability arguments are of any help for understanding mathematical applicability, but also that these arguments rather require a preliminary analysis of the problems raised by the applicability of mathematics in order to avoid some tricky difficulties in their formulations. As a consequence, we cannot any longer consider the applicability problems as subordinate to ontological ones: no ontological stance on mathematical entities (or truths) can offer an easy road to the comprehension of the applicability of mathematics.</p>}, number={1}, journal={Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences}, author={Ginammi, Michele}, year={2016}, month={déc.} }